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The Poles Take Over—A Cable

# THE *Nation*

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August 12, 1944

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*A New Weekly Campaign Feature*

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## Nine Independent Men

BY WALTON HAMILTON

✱

## It's Hard to Seduce a Turk

BY MICHAEL CARTER

✱

## World of Welles and Lippmann

BY P. E. CORBETT

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# THE *Nation*

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## *The Shape of Things*

IN JUST FOUR DAYS AMERICAN ARMORED columns swept like lightning across Brittany, cutting off the great ports of St. Malo, Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Nantes, and are now pointing toward Paris. The Russian army newspaper, *Red Star*, commented that the Americans "had carried the tactics of maneuver to their highest pitch." The Russians are fairly good judges in such matters. The British and Canadians, in taking Vire, have broken through the strong Nazi positions southwest of Caen and opened the way for them to meet the Americans advancing from the South. The western war appears now to have assumed a highly mobile character in that triangle whose broad sea-base is the French coastline from near Caen to St. Nazaire, whose sides are the Seine and the Loire, and whose peak is Paris. It is, however, foolish to predict that in the next weeks' fighting these particular topographical bounds will have much significance. We may well see a rapid German withdrawal from most of western France. It is a sign of the changed fortunes of the war that mention of Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire as the once inviolable bases of the Nazi submarine fleet comes as a footnote. For the wolf-packs of the sea lanes have long since been whipped into submission.

\*

INSIDE WARSAW TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND Partisans are reported to be savagely driving Germans out of fortified positions, seizing key buildings in the Old City, and standing firm against attacks by planes and tanks. As we write, General Bor, partisan commander, is fighting to maintain the initiative until the advancing Red Armies, whose guns can be plainly heard, effect a junction with his forces. It is testimony to the fortitude of a brave people that, after five years of unspeakable suffering and torture, the Poles of Warsaw should strike the first blow for the deliverance of their city. Such people have bought their freedom dearly and will properly insist on their right freely to choose their government. Elsewhere in this issue, Anna Louise Strong's story cabled from Moscow tells how the Poles from many sections of the underground in Poland set up their own Committee of National Liberation, which has been recognized by Moscow. There seems reason to hope that Premier Mikolajczyk, now in Moscow, may be able to



bring about some understanding between the Polish National Committee and at least the more liberal elements in the London government-in-exile, which claim some support from underground Poland. Mikolajczyk is himself an agrarian leader and appears acceptable to the National Committee. A stable central Europe in the post-war period clearly depends on a Polish government genuinely representative of the Polish people and friendly to Czechoslovakia and Russia. Among the Poles in exile, the anti-Soviet die-hards who rest their claims on the dubious Pilsudski constitution of 1935 may be stubborn; the rest will welcome the democratic rebirth of the Polish people. It is to be hoped that London and Washington will not persist in backing the horse that looked like a winner in 1935 but is not even entered in 1944.

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MARSHAL MANNERHEIM'S SUCCESSION TO the Presidency of Finland is generally expected to pave the way for a renewal of peace negotiations with Russia. At first sight it seems odd that Mannerheim, a dominant figure on the extreme right in Finnish politics, should be considered a suitable person to push negotiations with the Soviets. Yet stranger things have happened. Mannerheim's reputation as commander in the successful fight for independence against Russia at the close of World War I gives him a position enjoyed by no other Finnish leader. At the same time, unlike Ryti and Linkomies, the retiring President and Premier, he has made no commitments to Germany. Indeed, the old Marshal, brought up in pre-revolutionary Russia, has always been anti-German—as well as anti-Communist. Mannerheim may be the one man in Finland with sufficient prestige to accept stiff terms from Russia and strong enough to see that they are carried out against probable German resistance. Twice in recent months Finland has rejected terms that seemed extraordinarily lenient in view of the Soviet Union's favorable military position. Both times Finland's action seems to have been based on the hope that Germany would somehow be able to hold out in the Baltic and render some aid to the Finns. The trapping of the German forces in Esthonia and Latvia must have convinced the Finnish generals, headed by Mannerheim, that their position is now hopeless. It still remains to be seen, however, whether they are prepared to accept terms that will undoubtedly be a good deal harsher than those of June.

✱

TURKEY'S LONG-AWAITED BREAK WITH Hitler's Reich has come. All Von Papen's bribes, threats, and devious methods of persuasion have failed, and his large staff of diplomats and propagandists have been sent packing. A full account of the methods employed in this prolonged attempt at seduction is contained in Michael Carter's piece elsewhere in this issue. To many in this country it has appeared that the move of the

Turkish government amounts merely to a determination to be in at the kill and enjoy, unearned, the fruits of victory. But in justice to Turkey we must view its role in comparison to that of Hitler's Balkan satellites and Franco's Spain. If we have been exasperated by Turkey's refusal to come in on our side until the eleventh hour, Germany has been even more chagrined by Turkey's red-light neutrality that prevented the Reich from making use of the Middle-Eastern bridge leading to the Caucasus, the Suez, and North Africa. Had Turkey yielded to German pressure at the moment when Alexander's forces were backed up on the El Alamein line, or when the spearhead of the German forces was touching the Grozny oil fields, the Allies might have suffered a major disaster. Turkey's bets were probably on the side of the United Nations from the start and its action now will have an immediate effect on the crumbling loyalties of Hitler's Balkan allies—Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary.

✱

LEOPOLD S. AMERY, SECRETARY OF STATE for India, has now officially rejected Mahatma Gandhi's compromise proposals which Louis Fischer outlined in *The Nation* of July 29. Mr. Amery admitted that Wavell had asked Gandhi to make an offer but insisted that the Indian's answer was not "constructive." Since Gandhi agreed to support the war effort and acquiesced in the Moslem demand for a separate Pakistan, his conciliatory gesture might at least have been examined by the British in the hope that the present ugly deadlock could be broken. But Wavell refused to talk with Gandhi, the Indian nationalist leaders, including Nehru, continue to languish in jail, and the situation is back where it was before Gandhi was released, only that bitterness and disillusionment have become more complete. Lord Munster, speaking for the British government in the House of Lords on July 25, made it clear that the stumbling block was India's wish for a responsible government. This demand, he said, "wrecked Sir Stafford Cripps's mission" in March and April, 1942. Munster is undoubtedly correct in surmising that England's refusal to accede to this demand is the key to the present Indian impasse. Gandhi has asked whether "the Four Freedoms include the right to be free." Apparently, the answer is no. Meanwhile, in the midst of this war for freedom, thousands of champions of freedom, thousands of anti-fascist Indians are completing two years of imprisonment without trial.

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THE ANTI-NEW DEAL PRESS HAS BEEN USING up an enormous amount of precious newsprint to account for the latest series of reverses suffered by their favorites in the primaries. The ultra-isolationist Bennett Clark lost out in Missouri, according to the *New York Daily News*, because he neglected "to keep in touch with

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the home folks." The unfortunate Representative Lambertson of Kansas, a self-appointed commentator on the Roosevelt family, was rubbed out because of "a matter of personality." Ham Fish had the closest call in his political life because his district had been shifted and because "Democrats, hired by the CIO, carried Republicans to the polls in their cars." The sinister influence of the CIO-PAC accounted for the three-party victory of Vito Marcantonio and Clayton Powell and the smashing victory against Tammany opposition of Donald L. O'Toole in Brooklyn. One simple common factor in all these contests—and in most of the reactionary upsets this summer—was largely overlooked: in every case where the domestic and foreign policies of the Roosevelt Administration have been a central issue, the pro-Roosevelt candidate has won or else made a surprisingly strong showing in a traditionally anti-Roosevelt district.

★

LOOKING OUT ACROSS LAKE GENEVA toward the massif of Mont Blanc there is a marble tablet that bears the inscription: "A la memoire de Woodrow Wilson, Président des Etats-Unis, Fondateur de la Société des Nations." Today, the League he founded is a ghost and Woodrow Wilson himself little more than a memory. In the magnificent motion picture "Wilson," that memory is clothed with the flesh and blood of a living man, an American President who belongs beside Washington and Lincoln because out of a daring vision and a high moral purpose he conceived a structure of world peace. Alexander Knox's presentation is distinguished and convincing. The mass spectacle, which has cheapened lesser plays, in this picture serves to set and people a great stage—broad as the world itself—on which, for a brief but decisive moment, Woodrow Wilson moved as the central figure. Had the ending been something other than the betrayal, the heartrending collapse of a mighty vision, we might not today be numbering in millions the deaths of fighting men and innocent civilians of all nations. Now we are back in a second Wilsonian era. Now we have arrived at a new moment of choice. It is a good thing that Woodrow Wilson has been allowed to speak once more.

★

THE ARRIVAL OF 984 REFUGEES FROM HITLER'S Europe links us with war's tragedy as pages of printed words, whole books of grim pictures, mountains of statistics fail to do. The human tragedy of any war is almost impossible for one to comprehend if one has not seen it at first hand. The calculated and pitiless cruelty of Hitler's sadists is so far outside of our experience that we tend to reject it as incredible. Yet here they are, lodged in a little town with the American name of Oswego, N. Y., and they are real—old men and women and little children—not so different from us. And in Hungary today there are 600,000 just like them, temporarily saved

from death in the extermination centers of Poland by the protest of Americans and the American government. Some of these may be got out into Palestine—if we demand it insistently enough. Some into Turkey, which formerly refused even transit visas, now that Turkey has moved toward our side. And it is just possible that America could afford to receive a few more than the one thousand to whom the President promised refuge—America the war-rich land, the fat land, the land untouched by bombs, America, the deliverer.

## *Candidate in Search of an Issue*

GOVERNOR DEWEY'S trip to the specially convened St. Louis conference of Republican Governors was part of his search for a campaign issue. At the moment it is questionable that what can't be found in Albany was turned up in St. Louis. Apparently there are two wings among the Dewey advisers. There are those who feel that saying little and praying is the safest method. The other group feels that firm statements on undebatable subjects are better.

But the problem still remains. Frank Kent of the Baltimore *Sun*, which this week came out for Dewey, reflects the Republican dilemma when he writes: "One of the difficulties the Republicans experience in this campaign is to find a line of attack upon Mr. Roosevelt to which the people generally will respond."

At St. Louis, the Governors issued fifteen theses which they will seek to nail on the door of the White House. As Dewey expressed it at a press conference in Albany, they are intended to resolve "areas of conflict" among federal, state, and local governments on "domestic" issues—labor, taxation, government expenditures, roads, insurance, and others. As for post-war employment, the surest guaranty is free enterprise, or, in the words of the Governors' manifesto, "private enterprise under a business system."

But if free enterprise and states' rights are to be the issue, it is a hesitant beginning to which it is doubtful that "the people generally will respond." The war cannot be an issue. It goes well; victory is too near. If, as some Republican leaders believe, victory over Hitler this summer might help their candidate, it would also serve to heighten the bitter inner conflict which today rages between "internationalist" Republicans and the "nationalists." For that will be the time to ask Dewey just where he stands on post-war collaboration among the United Nations. What Dewey can shunt aside now as "iffy" will have to be faced when Germany falls.

It is for this reason that Dewey now seeks to separate "domestic" issues from "international" issues, speaking

of the latter in meatless generalities, but talking with great vigor and anger about "bureaucracy" and "New Deal inefficiency." Unfortunately, there are no "domestic" questions which are separable from international or foreign-policy questions. The administration of unemployment insurance and employment services involves durable economic planning not only at home but with other nations. International monopolies, cartels, high tariffs, and other trade barriers have a direct bearing on unemployment. Dewey's running mate, Governor John W. Bricker, has evinced little interest in the desirability of international trade free of major economic restrictions. He has been even more passive on the subject of post-war international cooperation. He is a "we-got-to-keep-our-own-sovereignty" orator, who may repel more votes than he attracts.

Dewey's attempts thus far to evolve safe-and-sane issues in other fields have been unsuccessful. His attack on the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief was swiftly stepped on by the saner elements within the G. O. P. Little has been heard on the subject since it was trotted out three weeks ago.

No less than the Democratic Party, the Republican Party is "a strange parade of incompatibles." What can be stranger than a party which is big enough—at the moment—to hold a McCormick and a Willkie? McCormick sits like a watchdog beside the citadel of isolation. Willkie, with his known hold on the mugwump, independent Republicans, has Dewey buffaloed by his silence. Dewey and his advisers know that until they take Willkie into camp they must step gingerly.

The Republican Party's tragedy is that it is not an opposition minority party. It is merely the right wing of the Democratic Party, a wing which must go along on New Deal legislation like the Wagner Act, Social Security, and the Fair Employment Practices Committee, but, in order to keep its franchise, must bleat about "curbing bureaucracy." Its attacks on F. D. R.'s foreign policy will not be on issues like Franco or De Gaulle but will consist of magic formulas like "secret diplomacy" and "selling out American interests."

The Republicans, of course, intend to raise all the hell possible about Sidney Hillman and the Political Action Committee. But even this plan is of dubious value. For Dewey and his political advisers know, from every poll and every other test of public sentiment, that the American people long for nothing so much as a clear and concrete program indicating the way to a future without war, in which working men and women can find security in their jobs and a chance of actually catching up with happiness. You cannot fight something with nothing. The PAC program offers hope of that sort of future to millions of Americans. To counter it Mr. Dewey will have to think up something better than mere accusations and warings. He will have to find an issue.

## The Philadelphia Strike

WE SEE two lessons in the Philadelphia transit strike. The first is that there is no point in wasting time on racial bigots. Neither patriotic appeal nor polite request by the military could get white Philadelphia transit workers to call off their ugly stay-out against an FEPC order giving eight Negroes a chance to work as motormen and bus drivers. The strikers began to go back to work only after the government showed that it meant business. We approve the steps the government took, and we hope they will be applied again, and more quickly, the next time there is an outbreak of this kind. The threat to cancel draft deferments of strikers, to bar them from other work under WMC orders, and to deny them unemployment compensation proved effective. The arrest of four strike leaders under the Smith-Connally act should prove a deterrent to similar demagoguery in the future. It is time that backward elements in the ranks of labor as well as capital learned that racial discrimination in employment is contrary to the public policy and the ideals of this country, and that the government is prepared to punish those responsible for it.

The second lesson of the Philadelphia strike is that the sooner we take the FEPC out of the shadowy realm of existence under executive order and give it full statutory recognition, with power to enforce its decisions, the less trouble we shall have. The FEPC's present weakness invites disobedience and stimulates defiance. These Philadelphia transit workers have been working side by side with Negroes for years; the only difference is that Negroes will now be given a chance to qualify for some of the better paying jobs. We are not dealing in Philadelphia, as we might in the South, with ingrown attitudes and deep-rooted living patterns. We are dealing with the naked, greedy, and unashamed unwillingness of white workers to give Negro workers a break. That attitude requires no special understanding; it is racialism in its crassest form. Congress now has before it the Scantlan bill to give the FEPC statutory authority and powers of enforcement and we hope Negroes and progressives will press for its enactment now, before the election, when they still have some bargaining power.

Finally *The Nation* urges Attorney General Biddle and U. S. Attorney Gleeson in Philadelphia to give the country a thoroughgoing grand jury investigation into all the circumstances of this peculiar strike. We call it peculiar because a majority of the employees of the Philadelphia Transportation Company had shown their own opposition to racialism by voting for the Transport Workers Union, CIO, several months ago in a union election. The TWU had campaigned on an anti-discrimination platform, in contradistinction to the "independent" union whose old contract with the company barred Negroes



from the better jobs. The fact that the strike was led by old "independent" union officials and the readiness of the company's personnel director to give in to the strikers' anti-Negro demands provide grounds for suspecting that the racial issue was deliberately exploited to split the workers and hurt the CIO union. This strike delayed war production and hurt morale, and it disgraced the United States in the eyes of the world. We want to see it probed to the very bottom and we want to see those responsible in jail.

## Hitler Underground

BY FRED KIRCHWEY

TODAY, when Hitler's power is threatened inside Germany as well as by the armies pressing toward its borders, we hear a lot of talk about the probable future plans of his followers. People are freely prophesying that the Nazis will "go underground" and pursue their aims by devious and conspiratorial means. I have before me, for example, a most convincing set of predictions by Walter Lippmann, published the other day in the *New York Herald Tribune*. Mr. Lippmann believes that the conduct of the Nazi leaders in the face of growing unrest and inevitable military disaster is that of men who "feel they still have something to live for and believe that they can still accomplish it." Their swift retaliation against the plotting generals not only prevented those gentlemen from repeating their masterly maneuver of 1918 and making the civilian authorities bear the onus of defeat. The Nazis, reversing the trick, have attempted to fasten upon the officers' corps responsibility for the defeat that is to come. Then when the Nazi movement goes underground and sets out to "exploit to its own advantage the inevitable suffering and frustration of the German nation," it will have an alibi to offer for the defeat.

I think this analysis is sensible. And it is not contradicted by the obvious determination of the Nazi chieftains to charge a high price for their defeat. If they are to lose, let someone else take the blame; and meanwhile kill as many of the enemy as possible, wipe out his towns, kill all the Jews and hostages and political opponents within reach—and begin again amid Europe's wreckage.

It is the meaning of these ugly probabilities that seems to escape Walter Lippmann; and I suspect it has equally escaped our official policy-makers. Mr. Lippmann is uneasy about the capacity of the Allies to cope with the problem. "Old conspirators like Hitler," he says, "know all the tricks of conducting an underground movement and one of the greatest difficulties the British and American leaders face in occupying Germany is that none among them has experience and few much knowledge of underground politics and of how to detect it and how to deal with it." But Mr. Lippmann has little to suggest. He

realizes that the Nazis have doubtless worked out schemes of escape, that they have money and connections planted abroad, and that they will carry on their post-war conspiracies through a network of international communications. And so he insists that the occupying powers, after Hitler's defeat, must manage somehow to isolate the Nazi underground in Germany from its connections in other countries.

But nowhere does Mr. Lippmann reveal an understanding of the revolutionary character of the problem. The Allied armies can defeat Hitler's armies, Allied political power, even backed by force, can never defeat fascism. Nothing can end the threat of fascist conspiracy except a revolutionary change in Europe. If Mr. Lippmann shrinks from the thought, he is simply allowing the conventional, accepted attitude of a secure capitalist society to weaken his grasp of reality.

There are people in Europe who have both experience and knowledge of underground politics. Some of them are still alive in Germany. Perhaps they will have something to say about how to "detect" and "deal with" the Nazi underground. But if they are too few, after Hitler's execution squads have finished their work, men and women can be found in every European country who know the technique. They have been using it effectively for almost five years and are using it today in courageous support of the Allied armies. I suggest to Mr. Lippmann and to the inexperienced Allied leaders that the forces of resistance in occupied Europe be invited to share the responsibility of wiping out the Nazi underground. It is a job for underground fighters, not for the boys in the AMG. Indeed, I doubt if the School of Military Government at Charlottesville has even an elementary course in revolutionary strategy and the technique of underground conspiracy.

But that is only the start. A fighting force cannot reconstruct a continent; it can only create the possibility of reconstruction. In Germany as in the rest of Europe, Hitler's creed and his political influence will be ended only when a decent economic order is established. The destruction of the great industrial combinations in Europe, the end of the political power of big finance, the spread of social controls to insure employment and a better standard of living—these will do more to "isolate" Hitler's underground and ultimately scotch it altogether than any policing of communications that the occupation forces may put into effect. When the Allied leaders worry about the threat of a Nazi movement after this war, let them reflect for a moment on the conditions that gave rise to the Nazi movement after the last one. Let them recall the attitude their predecessors of the twenties took toward every attempt to unseat the big industrialists and the army men in Germany. Let them face the fact that now, as then, they must choose between social change and fascism.



# The War Fronts

BY CHARLES C. BOLTE

## How to Read the News

ADMIRAL KING is credited with the wonderfully Bourbon remark, "During war, we should issue two communiqués: (1) We have been attacked; (2) The enemy has surrendered unconditionally." Doubtless apocryphal, but illustrative of the way many generals and admirals—especially admirals—fell about public information in wartime.

This feeling has given way to a more sensible information policy. Indeed, the pendulum has now swung to the other extreme, and we are so voluminously informed as to the progress of the war that Ernie Pyle threatened to stop reading *Dog Life* unless the magazine sent a reporter to cover the invasion from the dog's angle.

Volume doesn't necessarily mean clarity or accuracy, however; and though the American press and radio have given us millions of words of reporting, interpretation, and dream-analysis from and about the fighting fronts, I don't think they have done a good job.

The blame for this lies mostly with the editors in the home offices, and most particularly with the headline writers and the radio-bulletin writers. The full-page headline in the *New York Post*, "Yanks Invade Europe," is already famous in newspaper history: it appeared in the summer of 1942, and referred to the landing of a dozen Ranger observers with the Canadian force which raided Dieppe. The *Post* had another gem last winter: "We Land on Truk," which on close inspection was revealed to have been founded on an ambiguous Radio Tokyo report of the first U. S. carrier-based plane attack on that island group—where we still haven't landed.

More recently, we were kept on pins and needles for five days while Cherbourg's fall was variously described as "Imminent," "... 48 Hours," "Expected Momentarily," etc. Then there is the case of that Russian Army which for two weeks has been "Nearing East Prussia Border," while "Nazis Flee East Prussia in Panic," until we found last week that "the Reds" were now only eight miles away, having been four miles away a week earlier.

The editors have abetted the headline-writers by featuring the sensational dispatches. Morning dispatches have been rewritten in New York in the afternoon, with the sentences rearranged and an extra portion of scare-phrases added: "rolled forward on a broad front," "smashed through faltering enemy resistance," "tidal wave . . .," and the inevitable conclusion: "threatened to—" cut off, or by-pass, or encircle, or annihilate.

Nor are the correspondents blameless, though their record is far better. Many of them, more particularly the press-association writers, have an admirably consistent record of keeping ahead of the armies and capturing

more thousands of troops than the enemy ever leaves behind. There are, of course, notable exceptions—actually too many to single out.

In many cases the military themselves have led the reporters up the primrose path. At Cassino and Caen we had official announcements of air power delivering a great smash and the ground forces breaking through, with nothing coming of it but letdown at home and comfort for the enemy. The air-power boys have sinned most grievously in this respect, and hurt their weapon by claiming feats for it too extravagantly. But all is better now, with victories galore, and the current malicious gag in Washington is that the war has finally caught up with General Arnold.

There is a lesson concealed in this ill-tempered essay, however: To find out how the real war is going, instead of the paper war, skip the headlines, read the first paragraphs with one eye closed, and jump inside to the communiqué-texts, following them on a map—a relief map, if possible, looking for rivers, hills, woods, and road-junctions. Then relax and read the color stories, always remembering Ilya Ehrenburg: "In communiqués a city is only a word. But actually a city means machine-gun nests, houses turned into forts, well-masked mortars, tommy gunners on rooftops, mines concealed in cellars, just hell in fact."

In this way every newspaper-reader can be his own military expert, understanding the soldiers' difficulties, and taking with a grain of salt the reports of the enemy's imminent collapse. When he reads, as he might have last week, "Canadian troops of the British Second Army, bursting forth in a new attack pointed toward Paris . . ." he will reflect that the Canadians have been bursting towards Paris ever since the first attack on Caen, and have thus far only burst about six miles. When he reads that the Americans are driving across the Brest peninsula against scattered opposition, he will reflect that this may be a planned withdrawal, not necessarily a complete disintegration of German resistance; and a withdrawal that may carry all the way back to the Seine or even beyond, where new and tougher resistance will be encountered, as Dr. Goebbels has promised.

Especially will he take his morning military expert with a double grain of salt, and realize that this poor mortal is far from the scene, either second-guessing or shooting in the dark about dim and future events. To illustrate the point, we will close today's sermon with an apt quotation, which appeared in print the day the Americans thrust to Rennes and the British were stalled at Caen:

But many miles of the wicked *bocage* country lie ahead [of the Americans], and the Germans are strongly echeloned against the British, who face better country for fast going. (Charles G. Bolte, *The Nation*, August 5.)

# On Reconversion

BY I. F. STONE

*Washington, August 4*

1. At short range, the outlook is poor. There is little chance that we will succeed in reconverting to civilian production on the basis of full employment.

2. From the longer-range point of view, much progress has been made. This is apparent if we glance back at the comparable period in the closing months of the last war. "Near the end of World War I," the Murray-Truman report points out, "many committees of Congress were working on post-war legislation. But the public was not particularly interested and Congressional action was dilatory. When the armistice came, the post-war legislation that had been worked on for months died in committee." There was no reconversion controversy last time, with the exception of the great debate over the return of the railroads to private ownership. There is general agreement today that it is the responsibility of government to provide an orderly transition to a peacetime economy.

3. There is also agreement on the necessity for achieving full employment after the war. The most conservative of the Congressional committees dealing with post-war problems, that headed by Senator George, is as fully committed to the principle as are the progressives. "This country," the George report said in June, "never has had and never will have real prosperity without full employment. A man vainly seeking a job is not a potential customer for the products of American farms and factories. Multiply that man many times and the combined loss of purchasing power starts a downward spiral of production, which in turn causes more unemployment and more loss of potential purchasing power. Government war expenditures of nearly \$100,000,000,000 a year clearly demonstrate what mass purchasing power can do for American business." These are truisms. The point to remember is that they were not truisms twenty-five years ago. We have here a great historical change in the thinking of the American people.

4. This change will not make itself felt immediately, for there is as yet no general agreement on how to achieve full employment. Those who think that private enterprise can do the job alone have the upper hand, and their ideas will rule the reconversion period. But if the attempt to achieve full employment by private enterprise alone fails, as it almost certainly will after a few years of somewhat spotty prosperity, the importance of this change in public thinking will have immediate effect. It will provide a framework of economic understanding and expectation that should make necessary governmental measures to produce full employment possible.

Whether a conservative or a progressive Administration is in power when the slump comes, it will be able, and it will be compelled, to take steps far beyond the timid pump-priming of the New Deal period. It is important to keep in mind that basically this timidity was the fault neither of Mr. Roosevelt nor of his advisers. The timidity reflected the prevailing state of public opinion. That will be different in the next slump. The key sentence in the quotation above from the George report is the last, "Government war expenditures of nearly \$100,000,000,000 a year clearly demonstrate what mass purchasing power can do for American business." The question only a few raised before will be raised by many in the next depression. "If for war, why not for peace?"

5. These long-range perspectives are not advanced as cause for complacency but as a corrective to undue pessimism. Profound historical changes sometimes seem to take place suddenly but they are always germinated slowly. A people as individualistic and proudly independent as the American, living in a country which has made great progress under private capitalism, cannot be expected overnight to accept large-scale measures of state initiative and direction in the economic sphere. I am inclined to think that our chances of achieving a successful "mixed economy" with a minimum of social disorder are pretty good, perhaps all the more so because private enterprise will have a last opportunity to prove or discredit its claim to be able to provide full employment without state direction. The fact that almost everywhere else in the capitalist world, and notably in Britain, there will be "mixed economies" with large admixtures of socialism in operation may help to reduce the kind of stubborn intransigence in our own capitalist class that leads business men to support fascist movements.

6. Another passage from the George report may help us to get at the fallacy that will keep us from reconversion on a full-employment basis. "One school of thought," the George report says, "approaches the problem with the proposition that if business is profitable, the jobs, and consequently the purchasing power, will be provided. Another school of thought approaches it from the standpoint that if there is full employment at adequate wages business is bound to be profitable." These two approaches, the George report asserts, "are merely different ways of stating the same thing and accent the interdependence of full production and full employment." This is untrue. Large sectors of business can be fairly profitable while the economy is carrying a large load of what might be called stabilized unemployment,



as in the New Deal period, when the number of jobless seems to have been "stabilized" at about eight million. Time does not stand still, and the danger is that after the war business will seek to satisfy the country with the New Deal palliatives it once fought. Business will seek to supplement private employment with WPA-ism as a means of blocking the kind of governmental planning that can alone give us full employment.

7. Everyone is talking full employment but few have any conception of the enormous increase in the American standard of living necessary to achieve it. Gunnar Myrdal's comprehensive analysis of "Economic Developments and Prospects in America," to which I referred several weeks ago in *The Nation*, provides a glimpse of the dimensions of the problem. Even "if the production of motor cars," Myrdal says, "should be expanded to eight millions a year, compared with six millions at the pre-war peak in 1937, the motor car industry would nevertheless be forced to dismiss several hundred thousand men." There must be a sharp rise in consumption of all kinds of goods and services and this requires a sharp rise in wages.

8. But the fight in the Senate over the amount of unemployment compensation to be paid during the reconversion period not only indicates that this is not understood but that many business and big farming elements hope to use the distress of the reconversion period to lower wages. This is the meaning of the effort to keep unemployment compensation in the hands of the states and to reduce its amount, for unemployment compensation will put a floor under wages. When Senator Revercomb in a minority report from the Senate Military Affairs subcommittee pointed out that the Kilgore-Murray-Truman bill would give some workers more in unemployment compensation than they had previously earned in wages, the argument had an immediate effect. The idea of putting "a premium on idleness" was so abhorrent that a compromise was at once offered by the sponsors of the Kilgore bill, reducing the amount of compensation. But in the light of the concrete situation facing us, the argument is economically false, however appealing it may be to those who think in terms of the past. Unemployment compensation is the best weapon we have to raise wages, and the higher wages are raised, the less governmental direction and initiative will be required for full employment. The response of the Senate, the press, and the business community to Revercomb's argument indicates how little progress has been made in thinking through the implications and necessities of a full-employment policy.

9. Another indication of the inability of the business community to think in terms of abundance instead of scarcity may be seen in the Johnson bill for the disposal of surplus property. The supporters of the Kilgore bill, in an effort to obtain its passage, have dropped the sur-

plus-property provisions of their bill. Byrnes and the conservatives are backing the Johnson measure. It would take durable surplus war supplies, from jeeps and machinery to wool and cotton, off the market for five years. During that time much of these goods would deteriorate or become obsolete. This is only a round-about way of destroying wealth, and another example of how closely wedded profitability is in our society to waste and destruction, first on the battlefield, then in the warehouse.

10. There is a considerable gap between the acceptance of a principle and a readiness really to put it into effect. In principle, the George-Murray bill and the Kilgore bill are both for full employment but the latter spells out more fully measures to achieve it. That is why there is such opposition to the Kilgore bill, for business wants to be "let alone" to do the job itself. But no business man can venture the unprecedented expansion of civilian production necessary for full employment without assurance of enough government aid to save him from bankruptcy. Unless the government takes steps to bring about a similar expansion by his competitors and by other business men, not enough purchasing power will be generated to enable him to sell his goods.

11. The weakness of the Kilgore bill is that it gives no indication that even its sponsors have thought this problem through in concrete terms. Its strength is that it sets up agencies, with full representation of business, labor, and agriculture, which could take those steps when the public wakes up to their necessity. The Kilgore bill is far too largely a statement of generalities, and the setting up of a National Production-Employment Board, as provided in the bill, does not necessarily move in the direction of full employment. It may as easily become an instrumentality for a new NRA-ism.

12. The Kilgore bill is menaced from two directions. In Congress it is being whittled away in favor of separate legislation on separate problems such as unemployment compensation, surplus-property disposal, etc. Even if remnants of it pass, there arises the problem of administration. The men at the controls will determine their use. And the White House by the Clayton and Hines appointments has already handed over the key post-war planning positions to men totally unsuited to the task of achieving full employment.

**CORRECTION:** A copy reader, exhausted by the effort to understand the intricacies of monetary theory, inadvertently added a misleading phrase to a sentence in our Washington letter last week on Bretton Woods. "The starting point of those who met at Bretton Woods," said the original, "was at the opposite pole from the Kemmerers." The phrase added was "who speak for the protectionists." Kemmerer does not speak for the protectionists; his gold standard views imply freer trade.



# It's Hard to Seduce a Turk

BY MICHAEL CARTER

IT CAN be talked about now. At one time it was too uncomfortably effective to bring out into the open. For the Turkish government's decision to break off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany ends a brilliant psychological war fought by the Nazis inside Turkey's borders. Every German was in it, from Von Papen, the Ambassador, down to the humblest grocery clerk. They were all on the propaganda team; if they lost, it was not by reason of any amateur performance.

Naturally, the most effective tactics were directed at increasing Turkey's economic dependence on Germany. Immediately, the need was a two-way stream of war supplies, and at one stage in the war Turkey had to do business with Hitler because there was no one else within hailing distance. But Germany was looking beyond the temporary emergency and talked big in terms of permanent post-war markets. Prominent Turks were given posts of importance in German corporations. Krupp's representatives in Turkey were the former Turkish diplomat, Nureddine, and the former banker, Jahim. Junkers and other German aircraft firms were represented by Galip Ceilany, member of a good Turkish family. German insurance companies were tied up with Turkish insurance companies and with Turkey's biggest industrialist, Kazim, who directs the Turkish sugar industry and owns a bank.

The professional and upper-class society people required more subtle treatment. For them, it was German culture: Walter Giesekeing was brought all the way out to Istanbul and Ankara to play to packed houses and be paraded through a gala round of receptions. General Rohde, military attaché, and Admiral Marvitz, naval attaché, were cultured Germans of the old school. They liked nothing better than to spend a long social evening with a group of German-trained Turkish officers who, after all, had been their comrades-in-arms during the last war. Weekly parties by DNB at the Ankara Palace Hotel, parties at the Embassy—there was not a dull moment for anyone who wanted to take advantage of Nazi hospitality. The whisky never ran out at the German Embassy, oddly enough; the British Embassy, on the other hand, was constantly threatened with drought, and the American Embassy was bone dry.

The Germans were thoughtful in little things. During last winter's typhus scare, one pro-British journalist appealed to the British Embassy for serum. There was none to be had. Herr Seiler, the German press attaché, heard about it. Promptly, thousands of units were rushed

out from Berlin, more than enough to save the journalist, his family, and his friends—for Hitler. The Germans would solemnly point out to the two hundred German-speaking Turkish officials in Ankara how really fortunate they were to have such good relations with Germany and how unhappy they would be if these relations were terminated. It might even cost them their jobs. German-subsidized schools, hospitals, and churches interpreted in very broad terms their charitable and educational mission to the Turkish people.

When direct action was indicated a battery of no less than six German agencies were ready in place: *Deutsche Nachrichten Dienst* (DNB), *Transcontinent Presse* (TP), *Europa Presse Dienst* (EP), *Dienst Aus Deutschland* (DAD), *Transocean Presse Dienst* (TO), and *Nachrichten Presse Dienst* (NP). Equipped with the latest radio-teletype machines and staffed with first-rate newsmen, they had unlimited funds for entertainment and all other purposes. They operated chiefly through the Embassy. Their directing mind was Ambassador von Papen, whose devious wit and unflagging energy turned many a near-defeat into a propaganda victory.

There was the matter of getting the right stories placed. But since a German monopoly controlled the newsprint supply, ways could be found. The supply, of course, was strictly rationed through the Turkish newsprint controller. But extra paper shipments at low prices would mysteriously appear on the doorstep of a paper whose Axis sympathies had shown signs of cooling. On the other hand, a pro-Allied editor would discover that unavoidable delays had interfered with the delivery of badly needed supplies. When, after protest, the paper did arrive, it would turn out to have been damaged in transit.

Sometimes less subtle tactics were applied. A sub-editor who was finding it difficult to make both ends meet on \$85 a month would be visited by a fairy god-mother with a slight German accent and shown easy ways of relieving himself of all household worries. A chief editor would be given a lump-sum recompense for placing a lead article. One editor of a pro-Axis paper had a regular retainer of \$125 a month, simply for slanting his news and comments. Sometimes bulk subscriptions and heavy advertising provided an irresistible appeal to struggling papers that had been finding the competition heavy.

German bookstores attracted Turkish officers, engineers, doctors, and scientists with their technical and

scientific books in German or in Turkish, printed in Germany. These bookstores also drew less scholarly customers, who on occasion would find funds and instructions inserted in the books they carried away with them. The well-edited German propaganda magazine *Signal*—somewhat comparable to *Life* in format—was filled with excellent photographs and drawings by cameramen and artists from the Wehrmacht and the German navy. The magazine appeared bi-weekly in German, English, French, and sometimes Serbian. In recent months it has deteriorated in make-up and quality of paper and its sales have fallen off. But it gets wide distribution and copies are occasionally picked up in distant outposts on the Turkish-Russian border. Only two Turkish magazines appear to be wholly subsidized by the Germans. Both are published by Nuri Pasha, who owns a large munitions factory near Istanbul and up to a short time ago depended on Germany for all his raw material.

Radio programs from Germany and from Axis satellite stations are listened to for the music; not so much for the news. Since the military reverses began the news has become more and more unreliable and has largely been displaced by comment. The Turks have not been impressed. German movies have been shown in theaters that would take them, theaters which have come in for the largesse of Von Papen's friends. Throughout the earlier and more successful stages of the war, the Embassy held private showings of military movies calculated to overcome even the most die-hard skeptic.

Somebody has estimated that the Germans have been spending at the rate of \$1,200,000 a year in Turkey just for propaganda purposes. Much of it was in gold from Germany and from stores seized in the occupied countries. In their readiness to pay to get the job done, the Germans were second only to the Japanese. (A story went the rounds in Istanbul that an Armenian tipster worked well and contentedly for the Germans at \$130 a month until the Japs upped the offer to \$400.)

German propaganda did half the work of keeping Turkey out of the war. It failed utterly to influence Turkey to come in on the German side and so repeat the experience of the last war. But it is doubtful if the propaganda would have succeeded even as well as it did had it not been for the course of military events. As long as the Nazis were advancing down into the Balkans and moving toward Turkey's back door in North Africa, Turkey was in a position that made a break with Germany seem impossible. The situation was made even worse when the Nazi forces drove past Stalingrad into the Caucasus. It was at that time that Von Papen was particularly active in attempting to awaken Turkey's traditional fear and hatred of the Russians. As recently as last week, Germany threatened the utter destruction of Turkey's cities by planes based on fields across the Hellespont if the diplomatic break was made.

In an awkward spot, no matter how you look at it, the Turks were negatively, by military threat, rather than positively, by subtle propaganda, persuaded to lie quiet. Seeing certain immediate advantages in preserving friendly relations with Germany, the Turks were never convinced that their route to future happiness and security required a visa stamped in Berlin. As Allied victories mounted and the military threat on three sides receded, and as our own propaganda improved, the Turks moved toward the break with Germany that was probably inevitable from the beginning.

## 50 Years Ago in "The Nation"

THE SMALL VOTE CAST for judges of the Supreme Court in Tennessee last week shows the deterrent effect of a poll-tax. . . . The intention was to diminish the Negro vote, but it is found that a large proportion of the whites will not pay the tax. Then there is always a chance that some political manager may suddenly turn up just before election day with a pile of money and pay poll-taxes by the thousands, on the agreement that the voters thus favored will support his side. . . . The theory that a man should pay at least as much as a poll-tax towards the support of the Government as a prerequisite to having his say in deciding its character sounds all right, but in practice it generally works to the advantage of the corruptionists.—August 9, 1894.

THE SENATE COMMITTEE on Territories has reported favorably the House bills for the admission of New Mexico and Arizona as states, and apparently only a pressure of other matters will prevent the passage of the measures. New Mexico is still a half-foreign community, and Arizona has only about 63,000 people all told, but each is to be given as much power in the Senate as New York or Pennsylvania. Their admission will be a gross outrage upon the country, but each party thinks that it stands a chance of getting the two Senators from each of the new commonwealths, and nobody seems ready to make an effective protest.—August 9, 1894.

WE HAVE REFERRED to the way the socialists in Roubaix and Saint-Denis have had a free course and been glorified and got those municipalities deeply into debt. Reports from other French cities where the socialists are in control show a similar state of affairs, and make it clear that, for taxpayers, it is not only the first step in practical socialism which costs, but every succeeding step as well. . . . They give point to the growing conviction of the world that socialism may be very fine, but that it comes high.—August 23, 1894.

WE FREQUENTLY see startling figures as to the increasing number of the insane presented in the newspapers, giving rise to melancholy predictions. There is probably not the slightest reason for disquiet upon the subject. The definition of insanity, as everyone knows, is a fluctuating one, and it is not only true that many persons are now classed as insane who would not formerly have been so classed, but also more cases are returned than of old.—August 30, 1894.



# The Supreme Court Today

BY WALTON HAMILTON

## I. Nine Independent Men

**A**FTER an absence of some years from the front page, the Supreme Court is again news. It is, however, the antics of human beings, rather than the wisdom of judges, which has captured public attention. The antics move on the surface of legal process; the wisdom probes toward the depths of insistent problems—and each, useful in its own way, has been on parade. A reminder that men, even when they sit in high places, are not immune to the ordinary frailties is always wholesome. A demonstration that the feet of the Court are firmly, if somewhat fumblingly, set on the path marked "forward" is just now a welcome assurance. Upon casual displays of behavior columns of print have been lavished which might better be given to a recitation of what the Court has done.

Antics there have been; "decision day" has not been the dulllest of Washington spectacles. The querulous voice, the soft tone that appeals to Posterity, the stubborn I-refuse-to-go-along, the mutual exchange of the word "gratuitous," the defiant I'll-not-let-him-get-by-with-that has been somewhat in evidence. Phrases which reflect on the omniscience of colleagues have been hurled even if they have not survived oral utterance to find lodgement in print. The concurring opinion has been employed to slap down a protesting brother. The dissent has often reflected more of unyielding opposition than of reasonable challenge. More than one opinion, written as a concurrence, has eventually emerged as a dissent.

To one whose study is the Court such antics are more amusing than disturbing. They have appeared before; their like will appear again. When Saint Paul said it was good that brethren should dwell together in unity, the evidence is not conclusive that he had our Supreme Court in mind. And, if among the members charity is in order, the command is not that they shall all think alike. If eight of them are appointees of Mr. Roosevelt, the nine—instead of freely choosing each other—have been conscripted to work together. Although in concert they have the power to say, "We are the law," among them as individuals differences are bound to arise; and when a colleague honestly cannot accept the judgment, candor commands that he give his reasons. As currently we pass into a new social order, a cleavage in views is everywhere visible among the most reasonable of men. It would be startling if the brothers on the bench were

free from the perplexities of mind and belief by which all thinking men are beset. The drive of the work, the zest of inquiry, the pride in the craft all make for heat. The clash in attitude, idea, value is inevitable where decisions can emerge only from a conjunction of separate wills. If here it seems notorious it is only because the Court—unlike a corporation, an editorial board, a college faculty, an agency of state—has the wholesome habit of making its doings a matter of public record.

It would, I grant you, be more seemly for the gentlemen of the Court always to air their legal differences with courtesy. But the proprieties have always been powerful to corrode intellectual honesty; and as an outward sign of an integrity which refuses to be compromised, antics are to be accepted with tolerance. I can think of nothing more alarming than that the Justices should come to be of a single mind. For unanimity among able and wide-awake men can be had only on the assumption that ancient wisdom should not be disturbed or through the practice of suppressing the views of those who cannot go along. Against the dry rot of mutual agreement the whole tradition of the Court is set. A powerful prod to excellence is that "the opinion of the Court" must take the fire of its members; that arguments pro and contra shall have equal access to the reports. Our courts have decreed that justice-in-the-making shall be subject to critical analysis by the bench, the profession, the public.

The work of its last term measures up to the high standard of the Court. Actions at law reflect the times; and the record is such as a group of able, virile, uncloistered men might be expected to write. Never in its history have divisions occurred so often; never have its members so freely expressed their own views. Votes of eight to one and six to three are common; and, in spite of the overwhelming New Deal majority, five to four and four to three are still noticeable. A common division has come to be seven to two or seven to one; the unanimous judgment is now exception rather than rule. Votes, however, are but a faint index to views; concurring opinions, far more abundant than ever before, attest dissimilar roads to a like result. On the last day of the term the Court actually divided five to four as to argument when there was no difference as to judgment. More important, the division must be interpreted in terms of the issue before the Court. In question after question the current bench is in accord, where the old one—dominated by the Four Horsemen, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, plus Hughes and/or



Roberts—was divided. The cleavage in opinion is now far more often than not over an issue which a decade ago would never have been raised. The frontier of the law has been advanced; the craft is practiced in a manner more precise, intricate, and exacting. Often, perhaps far too often, simple arithmetic has been abandoned for the higher mathematics. The idiom of decision, as well as the plane of inquiry, has changed.

The chief reason for the shift has, of course, been personnel. The newcomers are not men of a like sense and reason with those who have departed. Stone, C. J., once with the left, stands now to the right of center. As his views, once voiced in dissent, have come to prevail, liberalism is to be preserved rather than won. The faith which a judge must keep with his conscience has been qualified by the anxiety of the Chief Justice for his institution. He captains a far more agile, if less stubborn, crew than the one over which Hughes used to preside. And whereas "the Old Fox" was able to get the jump on the brethren by his quickness in selecting the issue, Stone has a number of colleagues quite able to tell him that there is another way to put the question. Roberts has shifted—or rather been pushed over—from center to far right. A man of many minds, a vagrant in his intellectual positions, he has been prone of late to upbraid his colleagues for a lack of respect for judgments now outworn. He has become conservative without a departure from his former views.

The others, touched not at all or only slightly by judicial experience, are fresh from life itself. Black, with an uncommon "feel for the jugular," has won the place of primacy. He rarely misses what the case—as against the legal form in which it is cast—is all about. Although he professes more faith in "leaving it to Congress" than one with his experience in the Senate ought to exhibit, he has taken the lead in adapting "the enduring principles of the law" to the rapidly changing circumstances of life. Reed, it is true, is not comfortable when established landmarks are left behind. But, in spite of his meticulous craftsmanship, he is no legalist. His "conservative" utterances would startle the shades of some of the departed brethren. Recently he replied to a charge of Roberts that a decision had come to be like "a railroad ticket good for this day and train only" by citing from a Brandeis dissent a list of cases in which the Court had retracted outworn judgments. Then, speaking for the majority, he brought the list up to date. He can, in dissent, vote to tolerate Negro peonage disguised in circum-spect legal form; he can, for an all but unanimous Court, announce that the Constitution assures the Negro the right to vote in the Democratic primary. Frankfurter, who has mounted the bench without discarding the professor's craft, is the current storm center. The greatest of Holmes's admirers, he is among the least Holmesian of men. He reverently occupies positions taken by

Holmes, Brandeis, or Cardozo in dissent, and seems to regard it as sacrilege to advance the law beyond the outposts toward which they drove. He is sometimes right against the majority of his brethren; he argues, for example, that the idea that a state of the Union cannot be sued without its consent is a vestige of the dogma that the King can do no wrong. But he is likely to transmute a real into a verbal question and to lose the main issue in a frantic quest of some nice point of law. His standpattism is dictated far less by an urge to stand on the precedents than by a "felt need" at this time of peril to secure national unity by appeasing big business. In general he tends to convert the older liberalism into a dogmatic orthodoxy.

Douglas is a natural executive. On the bench his excess of energy is spent in doing more work and getting it done more promptly than any of his colleagues. As the cases come along, his feel is for reality. He is quite aware that the art of judging has its occupational hazards; he knows the stories of great judges who have lost touch with the times and become ossified. The youngest among the judges, he is most in fear of becoming dated. Murphy's dominant drive is toward justice. With him as with Brandeis, whose spiritual heir he is, the real search—for which he has been reproved by Roberts—is where righteousness lies. Neat crochet patterns of legalism, which get some of his colleagues all excited, leave him cold. But watch his limpid and driving prose when he proclaims freedom of speech, recites the dangers of the miner's trip from portal to face, or reproves the government for invoking the white slave act when the accused, by going on a vacation, had for a moment "lapsed into decency."

Jackson remains something of an adolescent who loves to try all the stops on the organ. At one moment he displays a picayune legalism—as when he catches up a rule of law contriving to save some poor wretch from going to jail for bigamy and uses it to allow the state most favorable to the employer to fix compensation for industrial accidents. At another he probes to the very vitals of public policy—as when he insists that the Federal Power Commission, far from being bound by the rigidities of a fair-return-upon-value formula, should shape the schedule of rates to secure from a public utility the largest service to the community. And Rutledge, last to take his seat, has already exhibited his independence. For him, as a dean accustomed to handle a law school faculty, mere judicial colleagues can have no terrors. He has the law teacher's critical attitude toward the rules, concepts, and moves which are the tricks of the jurist's trade. He is not often to be diverted from the path of justice in pursuit of some esoteric will-o'-the-wisp. In a recent tilt with Frankfurter over where the power lay to determine fair labor standards, Iowa talked right back to Harvard.

You cannot resolve such a bench, as you could that of old, into three parts. There is no longer a right wing of four, a left wing of three, and a center group of two to chant "We are the Court." The path of the law is now as likely to be blazed for the Court as in dissent. And when the cry is "forward," it is Black, J., more often than Stone, C. J., who directs the march. Black's leadership, always personal, is often executive; for when Stone dissents, Roberts, the next in authority, is likely to be with him, and to Black falls the task of naming the man to write the opinion. With him, especially when issues of public policy are dominant, Douglas and Murphy are likely to be found. And, as he gets his judicial bearings, Rutledge moves in that direction. But the accord is not a solid phalanx; and not even in a common

dissent are the brethren of a single mind. At the right there is nothing even so loosely coherent. Roberts often proclaims that he is orthodox, that it is his eight colleagues who have gone astray; Frankfurter has exhibited a growing fondness for his companionship; Jackson has on occasion converted the duet into a trio. Stone and Reed are not above taking a stand with brother Roberts; and Murphy and Rutledge have been known to forsake the majority for his fellowship. But allegiance is fluid; positions have not yet been stabilized; any permutation is likely to turn up.

[The second part of Professor Hamilton's article, discussing the current record of the Supreme Court, and analyzing its decisions in a number of important cases, will appear next week.]

## Polls, Propaganda, and Politics

*During the months from now until election, interest in public-opinion polls promises to boom. Each week the latest poll results will be summarized in this column, along with some pertinent comment on propaganda in politics. The series begins this week with some suggestions for discriminating interpretation of public opinion polls. Next week's analysis will cover the trend of opinion between 1940 and 1944.*

HOW reliable are the public-opinion polls?" many people ask. There is no easy answer. None of the large, publicized polls is crooked or rigged, and only occasionally is bias a serious influence. But it is easy to be misled by poll figures. Here are a few pointers on allowances to make.

1. *Size versus representativeness.* People are sometimes troubled because poll samples are small, because "no interviewer has ever asked me or anyone I know a question." If a nation-wide poll is based on a sample of three thousand cases, as many are (at election time this usual sample is blown up to much larger figures), it would take more than five hundred years at the rate of one poll a week to reach all the adults in the United States. The reliability of a poll is more apt to be affected by selection than by size. The *Literary Digest* went wrong in spite of polling immense numbers because it selected homes listed in telephone directories and neglected to sample the low-income population. What gives poll statisticians gray hair is how to make sure that every income level, political party, race, region, occupation, religious group, age group, educational level, etc., is

proportionately represented in the miniature population that is polled. A well-selected sample of one thousand cases may give a better basis for prediction than random polling of ten thousand. In forecasting Dewey's election as Governor of New York in 1942, the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University with only two hundred cases in a carefully selected sample predicted that he would win 58 per cent of the votes cast; the Gallup Poll with two thousand five hundred cases gave him 53 per cent; the *New York Daily News* with forty-eight thousand interviews predicted 57 per cent. The election results showed 53 per cent for Dewey. The smallest poll was nearly as accurate as one 240 times as large. Nevertheless, size of sample remains a factor. Chance must also be taken into account. If one hundred polls were made, each covering two thousand voters selected in the same way, they might differ so that most of them would show 52 per cent for Roosevelt, with a few reporting 49 per cent and a few 55 per cent.

2. *Polls report the opinions of a cross-section of potential voters, but not all those eligible turn out to vote on Election Day.* A million votes, properly distributed, could have elected Willkie in 1940, but in New York State alone two million qualified voters didn't cast ballots. About one registered voter in five doesn't arrive to make his choices known. Fewer women vote. Fewer young people (21-40) vote. Fewer men and women from manual labor occupations ordinarily vote, and industrial migration will accent this factor in 1944. Smaller cities have more non-voters.

3. *The "Don't know," "No opinion," and "Haven't yet decided" vote is not evenly or proportionately divided between parties.* Studies show that these people have fewer opportunities for contact with politics, less interest



in the election, less education, but come from social strata which vote mainly Democratic. Hence, if "No opinion" answers are disregarded, the results tend to over-estimate Republican strength. The proportion undecided decreases as the campaign goes on, but in 1940 there were still 7 per cent of potential voters apparently sitting on the fence as late as October.

4. *The Electoral College system means that a popular majority may not bring a majority of electors.* Cleveland won with 50.1 per cent of all major party votes in 1884, but lost in 1888 despite his 50.5 per cent of the major party vote. Democrats "waste" a lot of votes in the South, where they do not add more electors. Whether a party has a bare majority or 90 per cent of the popular votes in a state, it gets the same number of electoral votes.

5. *No one is allowed to poll the soldier vote.* No one knows how many soldiers will vote, or how they will vote, or how many of their votes will be counted. We do know that in June of 1944, when about 52 per cent of voters were for Roosevelt, civilian *young people*, 21-29 years of age, were 62 per cent for Roosevelt. No one can be sure that army experience may not increase or decrease this difference.

6. *There is always need to watch the specific form of question being used.* Most people are against sin and will approve ideals in general. It is only when proposals show teeth that respondents take fright. Three out of four Americans are "for labor unions," but something like half of these can be counted on to object to any specific measure for which labor unions are fighting at the moment. More people will express approval of daylight saving time than will favor a Presidential order establishing it. When someone is asked what he would think "if" something happened, he doesn't always estimate his own intentions properly. As a rule, differences in wording are less apt to affect responses on questions about which people have strong feelings.

7. *Most interviewers are middle-class.* A large proportion are college graduates. Respondents usually sense differences in speech, manner, dress, background, etc., and workers may be as suspicious and reserved when confronted by a typical poll-taker as would be milady of the manor if a strange man of rough appearance and crude vocabulary rang her doorbell and began asking political questions. Interviewers may tend to avoid the poorest districts and the most remote rural areas.

8. *Finally, the balance is now so close that unforeseen events between now and November are likely to swing the election.* No conceivable analysis of opinion today will satisfactorily forecast what would happen to it if New York were bombed by robots, if Hitler surrendered, or if a Roosevelt son died in action.

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## In the Wind

ONE OF THE THINGS that may have contributed to Wallace's defeat was a book. Its title is "Statesmanship and Religion"; its author, Henry J. Wallace. It consists of three lectures Mr. Wallace delivered at the Chicago Theological Seminary and another he delivered before the Federal Council of Churches, and was published in 1934 by the Roundtable Press. It was circulated by reactionary Democrats Thursday night and Friday of convention week, among a few important Wallace leaders. A dozen or more passages were marked. These passages were taken out of context to prove that Wallace was (a) anti-Catholic, (b) anti-Protestant, (c) atheistic, (d) communistic, and (e) fascistic. Anyone who read the book in its entirety could easily see that Wallace is none of these things, but the carefully marked passages appeared damning when read alone. The Old Guard argued that the Republicans might use these passages if Wallace were nominated.

THE PHOTOGRAPH DESK of a national news syndicate reports that Dewey insists on "serious, non-smiling" pictures, because, he says, the campaign is serious.

THE POST LIBRARY at Camp Perry, Ohio, with more than seven thousand volumes, has been closed for lack of funds to pay the librarian. At the same camp a private with a master's degree in librarianship is guarding war prisoners.

A RED CROSS CAR carrying a soldier with a heavily bandaged hand and another with crutches drew alongside a Fifth Avenue bus. "Isn't that a shame!" said a lady bus passenger. "Yes, those poor fellows," replied her male companion. "Oh, no, that isn't what I mean," said the lady. "Look at that sign: 'Donated by Local 32B, Building Service Employees International Union, A. F. L.' Isn't that a shame for the Red Cross!"

AMERICAN BUSINESS MEN may not trust the Soviet government, but they certainly intend to do business with it. *Printers' Ink*, an advertising journal, reports a 300 per cent increase in advertising by American industrial and engineering firms in "American Engineering and Industry," a Russian-language technical monthly published by Amtorg. "Catalog of American Engineering and Industry, 1944-46 Edition," another Amtorg publication, will have 1,350 pages of advertising placed by more than seven hundred American firms. The last edition, in 1942, carried about 250 pages of advertising.

PESTUNG EUROPA: The Nazis are melting down the bronze statues of Paris, but one of Lafayette has escaped them. A crew of workmen removed the 11½-ton statue from its pedestal and hauled it away in broad daylight—and it didn't occur to passing Nazis that the workmen were guerrilla fighters from the *maquis*.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]



## The Poles Take Over

BY ANNA LOUISE STRONG

Moscow, July 31, by Cable

IN THE past week Moscow celebrated an unprecedented series of victories. Thursday night five successive "salutes" hailed with guns and fireworks the liberation of six important cities in a single day. Along the entire front, from the Gulf of Finland to the Carpathians, the Red Army drove forward, freeing the last areas of Soviet territory in German hands, plunging deep into the Baltic states, and crossing the Polish border in a mighty sweep from North to South, liberating many large Polish cities.

These military victories led directly to an event whose political significance for the future of Europe almost transcends the military victory itself. This is the establishment of the Emergency Polish National Council as the civil authority, with a large Polish army which expects "to set banners in Berlin;" also the appearance of the new Polish Liberation Committee as the temporary executive power forming the local administration in liberated Poland. This was accompanied by a Soviet statement that the Red Army sets up no administrative organs but regards itself as cooperating with the Polish army in the territory of a sovereign, friendly, allied state.

These events aroused world-wide comment, ranging from attacks on the "puppet government" to milder hopes by liberals to combine the Polish National Council with the Polish government-in-exile recognized by London and Washington. Something like this may eventually be accomplished, but most comment misses the important facts and implications which *Nation* readers deserve to know.

Name-calling is futile. Any present Polish government must rely on the armed power of the Red Army as Badoglio and De Gaulle relied on the armed power of the Anglo-Americans. Every exiled government in London expects to take power with the aid of foreign armies. Thus the impolite term "puppet" strictly applies to all future European governments until they hold elections and create armies adequate to defend their soil.

The most important questions for the future of Europe are the following: How can groups claiming governmental power arouse and unite their people and quickly create independent, democratic states? What policies can such states propose for unscrambling Hitler's Europe and making a peaceful, democratic Europe? Behind these lies a third question which everyone has

been asking: What kind of independent states will the Red Army help to install and defend?

To all these vital questions the Polish National Council suggests the first and clearest answer.

Note that the first Polish National Council was not formed in Moscow. The Moscow organization, the Union of Polish Patriots, persistently refuses to consider itself a source of government. It has repeatedly stated officially that Poles in exile could not create a government, but only Poles in Poland. Its official position was that agreement with the London Poles for the creation of government was impossible since the latter considered the participation of the Polish underground "pernicious." The best government, they held, would be one created by all democratic centers of Poles everywhere, but if this were impossible then the underground in Poland might legitimately create a government, but not the Poles in emigration, whether in London or in Moscow.

This theory of government may seem superfluous, but it is important to understand that it is punctiliously observed here. This essentially democratic theory contrasts with the assumption of the Anglo-Americans that governments are legitimately created by their recognition, followed by elections and constitutional forms satisfactory to them. The Soviets assume that a government legitimately arises only inside a country, which creates its own forms.

How did this work in practice? The Polish National Council, the "RADA," was formed last New Year's Eve at a secret meeting in Warsaw, attended by thirty delegates from more than a score of underground Polish organizations, all engaged in active warfare against the Nazis. Some delegates were killed in attempting to reach the meeting. The list of participating organizations was fairly impressive, including the Peasant Workers' Party, the Socialist Party, the cooperatives, underground trade unions and organizations of democratic intellectuals, and various armed partisan forces.

The session supported the 1921 constitution, based on French democracy, and denounced the 1935 constitution, which so conservative an authority as the "Encyclopedia of World History" states was railroaded through by authoritarian groups. The session decided to unite the democratic partisan bands into "a people's army." It also formed a national council and decided to promote local councils to direct the fight for liberation.

Within four months this RADA gained enough popular strength to send a delegation to Moscow late in May "to contact all Allied governments." It traveled a great distance with an armed guard in Polish uniforms through regions supposedly controlled by the Germans.

What success RADA had in approaching Moscow, Washington, and London was not reported, but six weeks later the Red Army reached Poland. Then RADA took over the Polish Army of more than 100,000 men, organized and equipped in the Soviet Union. It combined these with the poorly-armed "people's army" already operating on Polish soil. It called for the mobilization of Polish manhood into a bigger army to liberate the country and enter Berlin. It set up the "Liberation Committee" as the temporary executive organizing local administration.

If all this originated in Moscow—as some claim—then Moscow is to be congratulated on scrupulously observing the forms of democracy in Poland—more than that, on stimulating democratic action and Polish nationalism to take over an army equipped by the Soviets.

Two examples show how punctiliously the theory of a government originating inside a country was observed. The commander-in-chief of the new Polish Army is not General Berling, who commands the well-equipped Polish Army from Russia, but General Rilia, who rose through service in the partisan groups and who has now taken precedence over Berling. Similarly the chairman of the new Liberation Committee is not Wanda Wasilewska, who inspired the Poles in Moscow, but Moravsky, a Polish Socialist Party leader with sixteen years' pre-war political standing, who organized Polish workers for defense in 1939 and later organized the Partisans.

In calling the Poles to fight for freedom the new committee made the frankest statement of policy. It operates on the basis of the 1921 constitution, repudiates the 1935 constitution, and has declared a speedy election of delegates to frame a new constitution.

In foreign policy the committee announced its participation in a strong bloc with the Soviets and the Czechs. It proposes to settle the boundary with the Soviets on the principle that land inhabited by Poles belongs to Poland while land inhabited by Ukrainians belongs to the Ukraine.

In internal policy the Polish committee encourages private property in farms and medium-sized enterprises. All large enterprises throughout Europe have been seized by the Germans. Those in Poland are to be administered by a temporary state body pending "regulations on economic relations," after which they will be returned "to their owners." This is a clear invitation to American capital to develop large Polish enterprises, since only America has the means. In the absence of American capital, the only practicable alternative would probably be some form of socialism. With American

capital there will be a system of private initiative, regulated by a Polish "New Deal."

The Poles propose to annex considerable German territory. This may upset some Americans. The Poles won't settle the peace terms, but their demands will worry the Germans and encourage their own people to fight hard. It is clear at least that the Soviet Union proposes to support progressive capitalist democracies in Europe. It is also clear that the Soviet leaders are fully cognizant of an ancient democratic principle which we Americans tend to forget, namely, that no nation can be liberated by another but must fight for its own liberation, that after long suppression people need the pride that comes of actively creating a government and mobilizing for freedom. This is what the Polish Liberation Committee offers the Poles.

Will the present Polish RADA combine with the London government-in-exile? Certainly not with all its members. Certainly not with certain followers in Poland who have killed Polish Partisans and betrayed them to the Gestapo. But some among the London Poles might strengthen a democratic Poland. For these the RADA organization has already provided a place.

While the RADA generally is now elected on a definite basis from various districts of Poland, a special provision admits 20 per cent of members to be "selected by RADA itself from distinguished persons." This would seem to anticipate some such proposal as additions from the Polish emigration. Clearly it is now for the Poles in London to make the approach.

## Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

ABOUT the middle of July the following decree by the Gauleiter of Brunswick was published in newspapers and on placards throughout the city:

All civilian party members and all compatriots who are not members of a party organization and who are able-bodied and capable of marching are ordered to attend a defense rally on July 16. All participants in the march, whether in mufti or in uniform, are to carry whatever weapons they possess, no matter what kind. No one must be absent.

Such "defense rallies" have been held in every German city and town during the past few weeks. The newspaper stories and photographs show that they all have the same pattern: the participants are always masses of civilians, and in the middle, like a backbone, there is always a detachment of soldiers, together with uniformed groups of Storm Troops, Elite Guards, policemen, firemen, etc. There are a few short speeches, a march of several kilometers, and some rudimentary military exercises.



What does it mean? The speakers say that the enemy is coming closer, the soil of the Fatherland itself is threatened, and all civilians—workers, old men, and children alike—must take arms to defend it. They pretend to be particularly worried about parachutists. Of a defense rally in Essen, for example, the *Kölnische Zeitung* of July 17 reports:

For the first time a Storm Troop battalion for special tasks participated. This is a highly mobile force with special training for fighting British terrorism in the homeland.

And at a rally in Hanover on July 9 the Gauleiter said:

Possible enemy attempts to land terror units among us to carry the war into our country will be opposed, at any hour, at any place, by our radical solidarity, which will thwart every attempt against our security, our work, and our transport.

But then the Gauleiter enlarged the circle of enemies. The purpose of the rally, he said, was "to prepare for any possibility whatsoever. . . . All measures have been taken to see to it that veterans of the last war and National Socialist youth take immediate action should there be any commotion anywhere." He described the purposes of such rallies throughout Germany as follows:

First, to enable the government to estimate the number of men available at home. Second, to give every individual ready for defense the certainty that thousands upon thousands of comrades are at his side and are ready to take up arms whenever the moment demands it. And third, to demonstrate to potential disturbers of the peace and instigators of unrest that the National Socialist community is more closely united than ever, and is prepared by all means to preserve the fruits of our struggle. Increased watchfulness is necessary during the coming weeks and months. Any suspicious fact must be reported, and immediate intervention must be organized.

And, in case these hints were not clear enough, a commentator in the *Essen Nationalzeitung* clarified them fully on July 17. Thus:

Parades have been rare of late, because urgent everyday tasks have left little time for them. But today it is advisable to demonstrate in a visible manner our united will. It will be useful not only for ourselves but more particularly for the numerous foreigners now living in our city, who do not share in our national and spiritual community. Some of them easily become the prey of enemy propaganda, since they have not the same political faith we have. The spectacle of a united phalanx of Germans under the swastika may discourage those foreigners who may feel inclined to work against our interests.

That, obviously, is the real purpose of this melancholy mobilization of children and old men, armed with "whatever weapons they possess." It is hardly likely

#### WARNING!

*In the summer of 1940, when most people believed that the battle against Hitler was lost, we proclaimed our faith in the final defeat of the Nazis. In the summer of 1944, when most people consider the Nazis already beaten and expect the war in Europe to end momentarily—even Mr. Churchill's speeches breathe optimism.—we warn our readers that the enemy still has strength to resist. This is not paradoxical. It simply means that this war is not only a military but a political war. Military results may be influenced by political acts, and the power of the German army may be temporarily increased by the purge of half-hearted, anti-Nazi generals and the total Nazification of the internal as well as the military structure. The fight between democracy and fascism is literally a fight to the death. It is too early to assume that the force of Nazi fanaticism is wholly spent.*

that such "phalanxes" could stop "terror units" of parachutists. The mobilization is directed, rather, against the "numerous foreigners" in the country—the twelve to fifteen million enslaved workers. Evidently the time has come for Germany to fear them.

An epidemic which worries the government, but which is quite understandable, has broken out in the German public. The news of it comes from Danzig—that barometer of a city which six years ago was so enthusiastic about going "home to the Reich." The enthusiasm seems to have disappeared. An outspoken editorial in the *Danziger Neuesten Nachrichten* bears the title "Map Psychosis," and describes the disease as follows:

Military maps are again laid out on the tables of the cafés. They are an infallible indication that the war has entered a phase charged with high tension. Now, the study of maps is a very good thing in itself. But if it degenerates into a mileage-mania, the basic value disappears in several respects. The all-around orientation reverses itself only too easily into sensations of geographical heart spasm. Then the miserable pseudo-knights of modern times emerge, whose thinking is even swifter than the achievements of instruments of modern technique. Bending over the maps, they draw what they call unbreakable circles with their right hands, while their left hands anxiously press their hearts. It is particularly in the Eastern corner of the Reich that these super-clever map students are becoming visible and audible.

The paper finds especially dangerous a thought which the map-readers "occasionally" express—"the thought that the mission which history has laid upon us might better be passed on to coming generations for the sake of the convenience of our own generation." Never has the "occasional" thought that it is time to quit been more delicately expressed.



# BOOKS and the ARTS

## The World of Welles and Lippmann

*U. S. WAR AIMS.* By Walter Lippmann. An Atlantic Monthly Press Book. Little, Brown and Company. \$1.50.

*THE TIME FOR DECISION.* By Sumner Welles. Harper and Brothers. \$3.

IN "Foreign Policy—Shield of the Republic," Mr. Lippmann hammered home a truth long accepted by students of international affairs, namely that any durable peace must depend on a nuclear alliance of the United States, Russia, and Britain. The hammering was so necessary and so effectively done that readers other than the professional historians were disposed to overlook some poetic license with the past. The difficult question as to how this tripartite responsibility and leadership were to be made acceptable to the world of lesser states was left dangling in an atmosphere of hope, and only the vaguest suggestion was vouchsafed us of that larger association in which the alliance was to be "nuclear."

"U. S. War Aims" has the same theme, some of the same virtues, and more of the same defects. The writing is columnistic, setting out many debatable propositions without supporting argument, and (notably on the subject of China and the whole Far East) ironing smoothly over the surface of profound uncertainties.

The nuclear alliance has congealed in this book into a perpetual harmony between a Russian orbit and an Atlantic community which includes at its eastern extremity Greece and at its western Australia and New Zealand. China figures as the great-power core of another community, and the future will probably see similar Moslem and Hindu associations. The author asserts that the most essential condition of peace between the Atlantic and Russian groupings is that neither should seek allies within the other's bailiwick or try to bring Germany or Japan into its own strategical system. He does not touch directly upon the disturbances which may grow out of conflicting commercial policies or out of rivalries between two regional communities for advantages in a third. Such risks may be present in his mind when he declares that "the wartime association . . . will break up into unfriendly blocks unless the regional groups cohere into a world order . . ."

The pages where we hoped to find this world order are given over to an attack on "Wilsonianism" of such virulence that it makes of the Fourteen Points a veritable devil's litany. The effect, though startling, is negative, and the general organization which emerges is so anaemic that one wonders how the author can expect it to perform any harmonizing function between regional blocs. He is right when he admits the danger that his great communities may degenerate into competing concentrations of power. But a world order capable of preventing this would have to be one exercising at least the authority to scrutinize all regional agreements to determine their conformity with general security. Mr. Lippmann's general organization, contrary to the Moscow Declaration, is to have nothing whatever to say on the whole subject

of security. One result is that the lesser states are left with the sorry comfort of becoming clients of their great neighbors, their destinies dependent on unpredictable wills.

Doubtless the author's purpose was to bring out in strong relief the stubborn realities which make it folly to expect that, once this war is over, nations can be speedily fused into one democratically organized security system. Certainly the reader is left in no doubt about these realities. But even here Mr. Lippmann overshoots the mark when he presents the existing obstacles as eternal verities.

Some passages will stand to his lasting credit. He demonstrates, simply but unanswerably, the dependence of American security on the freedom of the opposite Atlantic and Pacific coasts from the grasp of conquering empires; he shows the vast disparity between the hopes that have been awakened by the promises of international organization and the actual trend of decisions; he is everywhere conscious of the dependence of political integration on devotion to common values; and he makes it clear how cooperation between the great powers will be conditioned by the recognition and enforcement of basic human liberties.

But, though I could hardly qualify as one of those Wilsonians against whom the author fulminates, his book as a whole leaves me rejecting its historical analysis, its moral premises, and its political conclusions.

Mr. Welles is a Wilsonian, and his thesis is diametrically opposed to that of Mr. Lippmann. In this instructive contrast, the long-experienced diplomat presents us with a plan which, by the journalist's standards of realism, is hopelessly utopian. Yet if Mr. Welles has gone far beyond any nearby prospect of world organization, Mr. Lippmann, it may be hoped, has fallen no less short of the actual purposes of our governments.

Carrying on a crusade which he launched in 1942, Mr. Welles urges the United Nations to create now organs which can design the permanent organization and at the same time act as interim world authority. Chief of these organs should be a Provisional Executive Council of eleven members—one each appointed by the four major powers; two elected by the group of European states; two by the group of American states; one by the Far Eastern states; one by the states of the Near and Middle East and Africa; and one by the British Dominions. Action would be taken by two-thirds majority including the affirmative vote of all four major powers.

Upon the world authority, whether in its interim or final form (and the process of transition from one to the other is by no means clear), Mr. Welles imposes exacting functions of immediate pacification and long-term administration. He divides Germany into three distinct nations, and these are to be occupied for an indefinite period under the "supreme authority of the future world organization" which here, as in Japan, is to enforce disarmament and control economic activity. But the author's devotion to self-determination will not permit him permanently to impose any regime on an unwilling people. So, if a new generation of Germans

firmerly establishes a democratic system, the world organization must allow them to decide their own political destiny.

For security, Mr. Welles relies heavily upon regional organization. But where this is inadequate, the world authority calls into action not an international police force, but contingents promised by the major powers. In these arrangements, the author treats tenderly the sovereignty of the Big Four. Each of these has a veto. Lesser states are not so favored, and their protests may well wreck this plan, which clearly disregards the basic principle of sovereign equality announced at Moscow. Outside the immediate domain of security, opposition may be expected from the colonial powers; for the author's vigorously enforced trusteeship gives far greater control over states administering dependent areas than anything contemplated in current British proposals.

If the nations want permanent peace, they will have to accept organization quite as powerful as that proposed in this book. But the great states also will have to be brought under the world authority, not set on top of it. There is little prospect that this can happen in the near future, or even that Mr. Welles's plan can soon be realized in anything like its entirety.

But—whatever happens in world organization—"The Time for Decision" has other claims to permanent value. Some of it is first-hand and first-rate diplomatic history. The high point is the narrative of the mission to Europe in 1940, a hopeless yet imperative enterprise carried through with courage and with dignity. Surprisingly enough, in view of the author's reputation for cold correctness, the book is rich in human sympathy. One defect is an excessive tendency to loyal tribute, which at some points unnecessarily expands the text and weakens the impression of impartial judgment.

P. E. CORBETT

## Janeites Differ

*SPEAKING OF JANE AUSTEN.* By Sheila Kaye-Smith and G. B. Stern. Harper and Brothers. \$2.75.

ALL true lovers of Jane Austen do more than read and re-read her; they would talk and write about her too; write essays and eponyms and books; or, if worst comes to worst, write book reviews. Being a nearly perfect artist who kept to a very limited field, she offers her admirers few abstruse matters for speculation and no vast regions of inquiry; it may be that the harshest controversy she ever stirs up concerns the relative merits of her own six novels. But, for some, the temptation is also great to take up a kind of residence inside her world, to think of her as part of the family rather than part of literature, to be chatty and personal about her characters and scenes; in fine, to go on in a fashion at once too intense and too trivial to produce either a critical analysis of a writer or a psychological study of a woman. It was in this spirit that Sheila Kaye-Smith and G. B. Stern sat down and wrote, in alternating chapters, the present book; which, though it has its passages of criticism, has much more the solemn gaiety of initiates, the detailed gossip of lady authors and, in its worst moments, the gush of infatuated schoolgirls. I am not a true—or, at any rate, a typical—enough Janeite to be always easy in Miss Stern's and Miss

Kaye-Smith's rapt company. Up to a point I can be interested in their treatment of the food and clothes in the novels, or of the characters who are mentioned but never appear; but when they take to such prose as "Dear Emma! dear snobbish, cocksure, deluded Emma!" I begin to think lovingly of the novels of Maria Edgeworth and Mrs. Humphrey Ward.

I think too—to dispose of my other complaints—that for a book about Jane Austen this one is somewhat deficient in verve; and that its authors' worries that some of their opinions may shock their fellow-Janeites possess a coyness ill-suited to a writer who was never coy. Finally, the one unforgivable sin in writing (for the *illuminati*) about Jane Austen is to dot her i's for her; as when, for example, Miss Stern ventures to explain what must be everybody's favorite line in the whole of "Mansfield Park." And there is the united judgment of the authors—to which I shall return later—that "Pride and Prejudice" is the poorest of the six novels. Otherwise, for any well-posted reader of Jane Austen, there is good matter here; there are many interesting small points and some useful bits of information; and the two authors are often enough at ladylike odds to keep their collaboration from being a mere duet.

They differ, for instance, over "Mansfield Park": Miss Kaye-Smith more or less accepting Fanny as a person, as well as Fanny's marriage to Edmund; Miss Stern being dissatisfied with Fanny and wishing she could have married Henry Crawford. Miss Stern, indeed, introduces a lively discussion of "the Mansfield Park quartette." Mr. Edmund Wilson, reviewing this book in the *New Yorker*, felt that Miss Stern's was a woman's attitude, women objecting to the prig and creep-mouse in Fanny because they tend to identify themselves with her, whereas men are willing to accept her for what she is. To wish that Fanny had married Henry is, I think, truly feminine; but with Fanny herself the nub of the matter may lie elsewhere—in Elizabeth Bowen's comment (to be sure, I am quoting another woman) that "Mansfield Park" is "the most nearly insincere novel that Jane Austen ever wrote." The real trouble is that Fanny is not seen clearly in the light of Jane Austen's own values; it is not what Fanny is that dissatisfies us, but Jane Austen's tone in delineating her. At Emma, Jane Austen is plainly always laughing a little; in Elizabeth Bennett she is living vicariously and plainly reveling; with Anne Elliot she is noticeably identifying herself. But Fanny she would seem to approve from too complaisant a regard for conventional worthiness; she seems, for once, not quite to have trusted her humor and taste. It would be different were Fanny a coldly objective study of a type; but Fanny is presented, in every approving way, as a heroine.

All this is regrettable, for in "Mansfield Park" the stage is really set for the finest comedy of contrasts in any of the novels—with the virtue in Fanny and Edmund marred by priggishness and conceit, and the vivacity in Mary and Henry marred by shallowness and indulgence. Here, if ever, Jane Austen herself should have served as a balance wheel; should have gone about her comedy of social and amatory cross-breeding with supreme detachment, and have emphasized the faults in both pairs by her own perfect discrimination. As it is, the scales seem weighted against the Craw-




fords, and the book gives off a faint odor of sanctimonious morality. There is superb finish to "Mansfield Park," but faulty equilibrium.

As for ranking the novels, both Miss Stern and Miss Kaye-Smith put "Emma" first, letting it just nose out "Persuasion"; a verdict with which I am slowly coming to agree. Discussing the relative unpopularity of "Emma," Edmund Wilson finds it the "Hamlet" of the novels, from its containing an unabsorbed, really an external, element which must yet be recognized; and he offers an interesting analysis of Emma herself as a woman more interested in managing other women than in fulfilling herself through men. This is probably true of Emma, considered realistically; but I wonder whether it isn't to obscure a more important point, which is that Emma is really handled satirically. Emma—endowed with all the assurance of youth, the complacency of a superior station, the arrogance of a spoiled darling—is a target for comedy; and in terms of her comic role, the point about her trying to manage young women is that she invariably mismanages them. At any rate, if "Emma" remains relatively unpopular, it is much less, I think, from an unabsorbed element than from its undeviating tone—a tone of comedy pure and unalloyed. Nothing farcical intrudes upon it, as in "Pride and Prejudice"; nothing romantic, as in several of the novels; nothing poetic, as in "Persuasion." And all these other elements are more readily apprehended and enjoyed; comedy so dry as "Emma's," a comic outlook so thorough-going, must always be caviare.

As for Miss Stern's and Miss Kaye-Smith's verdict on "Pride and Prejudice," it is the opinion of many official Janeites; perhaps one must hold that opinion to qualify as a Janeite at all; but it still seems to me dead wrong, and one of the dangers of over-cultivation. "Emma" and "Persuasion" may be caviare; but putting "Pride and Prejudice" at the very bottom of the list—after even "Northanger Abbey"—is of a piece with liking your wild duck very, very bloody and undercooked. As part of my homework, I have just re-read "Northanger Abbey," which I found extremely pleasant, but not in a class with "Pride and Prejudice." It hasn't a tenth of the virtues—of the freshness and high spirits, the bold scene-painting and brilliant character-drawing; and when it comes to the faults in which "Pride and Prejudice" abounds, "Northanger" has fault after fault to match them. If "Pride and Prejudice" has a story-book plot, so in a sense has "Northanger." If in "Pride and Prejudice" the comedy is spattered with farce, that in "Northanger" is splashed with burlesque. If Lady Catherine de Bourgh is wildly overdrawn (though, by the bye, Lord David Cecil, who should know as well as anybody nowadays can, says there were many aristocrats like her), what of General Tilney, whose behavior is as excessive without being a fraction as entertaining? And what goes for "Northanger" goes on different grounds for "Sense and Sensibility" also. Miss Stern and Miss Kaye-Smith are entitled, of course, to their preferences in the matter; but if they would pronounce a critical judgment as well, *we* are entitled to more formidable reasons.

LOUIS KRONENBERGER



*Louis H. Pink*  
Former New York State Superintendent of Insurance, now President of Associated Hospital Service of New York  
offers an  
**American Beveridge Plan**  
in his new book

## FREEDOM FROM FEAR

With an Introduction by OWEN D. YOUNG

This book underscores Uncle Sam's signature to one of the major promises of the Atlantic Charter. As no other qualified authority has made so vividly clear before, Mr. Pink shows why and how the task of ridding mankind of the fears of insecurity due to illness, idleness and old age can succeed only through the simultaneous action of all nations. Every man's stake in the fear-free world he wants is here realistically and hopefully set forth. "An informative and timely book."

—N. Y. Herald Tribune.

## Fascism—American Style

ARGENTINE DIARY. By Ray Josephs. Random House. \$3.

NOT all the high-powered trivia and soiled confetti of Mr. Josephs's style could discourage me in the reading of this book. Its bright aniline colorfulness, its excessively thyroidal vigor are not more than disfigurements of an unusually interesting book.

Perhaps one has no right to expect a contemporary foreign correspondent to write as well as Nevins, Ransome, or even Richard Harding Davis. But when it comes to facts, to both their background past and their implication for the future, Mr. Josephs is first-rate. There is here no sense of deeply outraged morality, as there was in "Berlin Diary," and Mr. Josephs knows nothing of Mr. Shirer's economy of argument. Yet in its way this is another "Berlin Diary." "Argentine Diary" covers only a brief period of time, from January 1943 to January 1944, but it gives as reliable a picture of the establishment of the present pro-fascist or semi-fascist dictatorship in the Argentine as can anywhere be found.

Comparing charges made in this book with Mr. Hull's July 26 statement on Argentine policy, one sees that Mr. Josephs has provided a mass of evidence which is, point by point, confirmatory of Mr. Hull's case. Paragraph 2 of the State Department's paper declares that the present Farrell regime has given positive aid to the Axis. Not only the Farrell regime, says Mr. Josephs, but the preceding regimes of Castillo and Ramirez. That the dictators have not merely



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**A NON-FICTION BEST SELLER**

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# YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS

*→ is not considered suitable reading  
for your men overseas:*

Congress recently passed an amendment to the Soldiers' Voting Act (Title Five of Public Law 277, the Hatch Act). Pursuant to the War Department's interpretation of the act, **YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS**, Catherine Drinker Bowen's biography of the late Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, cannot be purchased for Army education courses or for Army libraries. Further, after having been accepted for inclusion in "Armed Service Editions," which make available to the services overseas important new books at very low cost, it was, following passage of the Hatch Act, excluded. Because of shipping problems *no* package can be sent to Army personnel except on written request of the individual service man.

The reason for the exclusion of **YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS**, according to law, is that it contains "political argument or political propaganda . . . designed or calculated to affect the result" of various Federal elections.

When **YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS** was published and selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club, the free American press greeted it as "a magnificent book . . . about inspiring men" (*Los Angeles Times*), that "ranks with the finest biographies of our time" (*Boston Herald*). The American public, by the democratic method of preference and choice, has made this distinguished biography of a distinguished American a national best selling non-fiction book. But an overzealous Congress, probably with entirely different objects in view, has passed a law which the Army has interpreted as forbidding the purchase of **YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS** and some other fine American books such as Charles Beard's *The Republic*. Officials of the War Department explain that it is not their place to criticize the law but to administer it. The framers of the Amendment contend it was designed to "prevent pernicious political activities." How, in the name of common sense, does **YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS** come into that category? Here is censorship in its most virulent form. Here is a frontal attack on Freedom of Speech and of the Press. We refuse to tolerate it in silence. We urge you to write your Senators and Congressman, demanding the repeal of that part of the Hatch Act which, in operation, makes all but inaccessible to *our men overseas* the free distribution of free ideas, one of the privileges for which they are fighting



**LITTLE, BROWN & COMPANY and THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS**

**BOSTON**

tolerated trade with Axis countries but have flagrantly supported their propaganda machines in the Argentine is a point Mr. Josephs makes repeatedly. "Within the last two weeks," declares Mr. Hull, "newsprint imported under grant of allied navicerts has been supplied" to four fascist newspapers, Axis propaganda sheets.

Well-informed as he evidently has taken pains to be, Mr. Josephs is not strong as an analyst. That the Argentine militarists are steadily moving toward a more extreme dictatorship he sees, and he describes their technique with adequacy. He has no doubts that all their talk about neutrality is chiefly a cover for their interior politics. Confirming Mr. Hull, he notes that the Farrell regime and its predecessors have deliberately emptied their few anti-Axis measures of all significance while they have used constantly increasing severity in their suppression of Argentine liberties.

But so conscientious is the author as a reporter that he gives the reader of some political sophistication ample material for thought concerning the regime's success in resisting interior and exterior opposition. That the conventional left-wing explanations are bad, Mr. Josephs's intensely interesting page 91, dated July 19, makes clear. In this he gives a fascinating review of the ten reasons offered him by "best-informed observers" in answer to the question, why does Argentina cling "so stubbornly to her neutrality policy?" (Mr. Josephs's formulation.) Reason One expresses that fear of social revolution which was a considerable element in Chamberlain circles in Britain. Of the nine others, eight explicitly confess, or logically imply, sincere belief in neutrality, at one level of belief or another. Just as Mr. Chamberlain made use of the deep-rooted and quite honorable pacifism of the British people, the Argentine dictators, the author's report compels one to believe, are consciously utilizing a genuine sentiment in their own dishonest interests. In its exterior aspect Farrell's policy is not so very different from that of Irigoyen, whom Argentine and northern democrats admire, during the first world war.

Elsewhere, Mr. Josephs says that a very great part of Argentine public opinion, perhaps a majority opinion, desires a United Nations victory. There is no doubt about it. But an equally striking thing about this report is that there is nowhere in it any mention of popular resistance to Farrell or effective demand for a change in foreign policy. The Iriburu counter-revolution of 1930 and its consequences have, of course, made organizational resistance difficult. But while Mr. Josephs mentions student protests and cautious dissent upon the part of great newspapers, what resistance he describes comes chiefly from military and naval groups whose interests are apparently as personal as those of Farrell and his predecessors. In that he confirms the report of an Argentine Socialist deputy with whom the reviewer talked some six months ago.

Mr. Josephs would probably agree that it was the personalism of the Irigoyen democracy, or sham democracy, that brought it down. It has been so with Argentine democratic movements ever since. They have rarely sought vigorously to strike roots among the masses, or to organize in a solid fashion. The observation enables one to see the weakness of Mr. Hull's policy. There is, by the way, little sign that Mr. Josephs has any better understanding than the State Depart-

ment. He has not, apparently, asked himself the necessary question, how could it profit the miserable day laborer of Mendoza to go to war against the Axis? Obviously it could only profit him if intervention brought with it the firm establishment of a creative democracy or if it produced conditions likely to lead to that. There is little in United States or British foreign policy to give the Mendoza laborers ground for believing that we care about such a thing. In Brazil there is a regime not greatly different from Farrell's; in Peru there is another such. Both, being on our side, are "good governments." The explanation is that we must not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. Obviously the irreconcilable contradictions of our policy spring from distrust of the whole contemporary revolution. All of Mr. Hull's charges are true, and he is quite right to withhold recognition from Farrell. But there is no solution in the glacial formalism that so far has guided Washington. Mr. Josephs's comment gives little sign of revolutionary understanding, but "Argentine Diary" helps one to positive belief.

RALPH BATES

## New Writing in Wartime

CROSS-SECTION. Edited by Edwin Seaver. L. B. Fischer. \$3.50.

THE anthology of new writing has by now become as much an important part of the literary scene as the periodical. Hence it is natural to compare Mr. Seaver's collection to the volumes of *The American Caravan*, *New Writing*, and *New Directions* which have appeared for the past fifteen years. And such a comparison leads to the overwhelming impression that this is the weakest of the lot and that some extreme setback may have occurred in the quality of literary consciousness.

Mr. Seaver's collection contains a good deal of competent writing of a certain kind: it is not the absence of this competence, nor is it a naive expectation of masterpieces which gives one a sense of dismay. The depressing thing is the level at which the competence is active. The authors of fiction in this volume had available as models a whole generation—Silone, Malraux, Céline, Brecht, to name only the examples from Europe—to show how the experience of prolonged crisis, which is a leading theme here, can be dealt with without descending to flat naturalism or deceiving oneself with arbitrary experiment for its own sake. And, before Silone and Malraux, such authors as Mann, Gide, Proust, and Joyce were available as literary influences. Yet, apart from the brief representation of poetry, which presents some good poets but in weak examples of their work, there is very little to suggest that these new authors have begun to write in the same literary period as the models just cited. Perhaps this summary judgment ought to be qualified, since there is a play about the death of García Lorca. But the substance of the qualification can be judged by the line "Flowers of the world, unite!"

It is hardly just a question of sensitivity to literary influence. The best piece in the collection, "My Wife the Witch," by Ira Wolfert, is an extraordinary story in which Mr. Wolfert makes use of the powerful device of the apparition of the dead, and yet without any evidence that he has studied



B. Fischer.

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Here these are chiefly proletarianism, a term which now seems to belong to some other life, and the anecdotal idiom of the *New Yorker*. Proletarianism still functions in the old way by dictating the subject and emphasizing the topical as the important, so that Mr. Seaver includes a good many poor pieces about the oppression of the Negro; and again, as of old, this emphasis, fixed as it is upon abstractions, makes the story evolve and then resolve itself in terms of a cause worthy in itself, hence sanctified, hence triumphant in the end, like *Cinderella*, and like all melodrama. Richard Wright's ambitious story fails because of melodrama of several kinds, and because of the usual failing of allegory, the over-simplified correspondence between particular detail and theme.

The influence of the *New Yorker* shows itself here as in its native haunts mainly in the use of insignificant patter to provide movement and characterization; and it shows itself also in the quality of observation employed to get in the detail of the background. It is most often the kind of observation likely in professional women, who come home to make dinner, and are suburban liberals in every pore of their beings; which is all very well in a magazine where stories are surrounded by the distractions of cartoons and advertisements, but which is strange in a volume committed to serious new writing. And even the *New Yorker's* bogus sophistication seems desirable when, in a story about two old maid sisters, one arrives at this sentence: "Albert was a gynecologist, and maybe that was why he was more at home there, even on nights when two or three lady buyers were up."

Perhaps the fault is with criticism, or the critical views most of these new authors seem to assume in their writing. So much at least is suggested by the one critical essay in the book, an essay which concerns itself, in a way bordering on fantasy, with calculations as to the time, place, character, nationality, and authorship of the new "War and Peace." The blueprints are detailed enough to make the fortune of a publisher's scout, for we are told that the new masterpiece will be written in some ten years, the author will probably be Russian, he will certainly be a Marxist, and—breathtaking insight!—"certainly a genius!" "The leading contender" at present is Sholokhov, but the critic fears that he may have enough work on hand already. These computations go forward with a terrifying literalness; they come to sound like the ticking of a time-bomb; until, at the end, the critic annihilates his essay with the bland remark: "If this essay should lead to the production of a new 'War and Peace,' it would

The quest of the new "War and Peace" reminds one of the old search for The Great American Novel, and to complete the picture, there is a play which reads as if it had just been written by Eugene O'Neill for the Provincetown Playhouse. Its title is "The Man Who Had All the Luck," and it will soon be produced on Broadway. Perhaps we are returning to 1920.

DELMORE SCHWARTZ

DELMORE SCHWARTZ

...and you'll say it, too...

# Revolutions in Russia

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—N. Y. Times Book Review

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# Surrealist Painting

BY CLEMENT GREENBERG

## I

**SURREALISM** is the only programmatic and more or less compact aesthetic movement aside from Pre-Raphaelitism to affect directly more than one of the arts. The number of parallels between the two movements—already glimpsed by Herbert Read and R. H. Wilenski—are surprising. Both are inspired by an ambition which looked first to change the décor and then the structure itself of industrial society. Dissatisfaction with the state of the arts grew into a more radical dissatisfaction with the very quality of life, which could vent itself only through politics.

Like the Pre-Raphaelites, the Surrealists have gone, although less consciously, in two different directions. Morris and Ruskin made their way to revivalist socialism, while the other Pre-Raphaelites, reconciling themselves to the status quo, became fashionable missionaries of aestheticism and religiosity. The orthodox Surrealists have stood firm on socialism, yet their stand has not kept Surrealism from becoming largely identified with the younger generation of smart international bohemia, to whom the movement has furnished a new principle of taste. The desire to change life on the spot, without waiting for the revolution, and to make art the affair of everybody is Surrealism's most laudable motive, yet it has led inevitably to a certain vulgarization of modern art. The attempt is made to depress it to a popular level instead of raising the level of popularity itself. The anti-institutional, anti-formal, anti-aesthetic nihilism of the Surrealists—inherited from Dada with all the artificial nonsense entailed—has in the end proved a blessing to the restless rich, the expatriates, and aesthete-flaneurs in general who were repelled by the asceticism of modern art. Surrealist subversiveness justifies their way of life, sanctioning the peace of conscience and the sense of chic with which they reject arduous disciplines. Not all the steadfastness of its leader in protesting against corruption wherever he could see it has prevented this ambivalence in the effects of Surrealism from eating back into and corrupting Surrealism itself.

The Pre-Raphaelites, for all Ruskin's insistence on going to nature "in all singleness of heart," looked mostly to the past for inspiration as to motifs, style, and décor. The Surrealists, promoting a newer renaissance of the "Spirit of Wonder," have cast back to those periods after the Middle Ages which were fondest of the marvellous and which most exuberantly exercised the imagination: the Baroque, the late eighteenth century, and the Romantic and Victorian nineteenth century. Surrealism has revived all the Gothic revivals and acquires more and more of a period flavor, going in for Faustian lore, old-fashioned and flamboyant interiors, alchemistic mythology, and whatever else is held to be the excesses in taste of the past. Surrealism is "advanced," but its notion of the future is not too unlike the comic-strip fantasies about the twenty-first century.

The effects of Surrealism in art and literature have differed in much the same way as did those of Pre-Raphaelitism. In both cases literature has benefited more than painting—English poetry through the Rossettis and through Swinburne

(who was at least influenced by Pre-Raphaelitism); French letters through Eluard, Aragon, Breton, and others. Both movements were essentially literary and placed all emphasis on the anecdotal, notwithstanding that the Pre-Raphaelite movement was made up largely of painters and that both Pre-Raphaelite and Surrealist poetry bears a strong pictorial impress. The pictures of the Pre-Raphaelites form a doubtful contribution, ratifying literary vices habitual to English art; while in the arts and crafts Morris and his followers practiced little more than antiquarianism. A good deal of Surrealist painting has similarly suffered from being literary and antiquarian.

## II

Surrealist writing more or less fulfils the Surrealist theory of creation as an automatic procedure uncontrolled by reason or the deliberate consciousness. Inspiration is induced by surrender to immediate impulse and to accident; thus the writer—or painter—reveals his unconscious to himself and to his audience, whose own unconscious is stirred by echoes. But in the practice of painting it is much harder than in that of poetry—though equally difficult in theory—to tell where the unconscious stops and the reasoning will takes over. The poet, subjecting his invention to meter or rhyme or logic, knows that he thereby suspends the automatic process. But the Surrealist painter, beginning with the first thing that comes into his mind—with accidents met in the manipulation of his tools, or with hints from the seams and texture of Leonardo's old wall, finding in these ways suggested resemblances to actual objects, which he proceeds to improve upon—the painter is not so apt to realize that he interrupts the automatic procedure the moment he begins to enhance these resemblances by methods taught in art school. For the trained painter can exercise the consciously acquired habits of his craft while seeming to absent his mind's attention and rely solely on his hand and eye. This, however, is not the same as automatic creation. Rubens had Plutarch and Seneca read to him while he painted, but he did not withdraw his conscious attention from his work, he simply divided it like any painter one knows who can carry on a conversation while working. There was indeed an element of automatism in Rubens's art, as there is in all successful art, but it was not the primary factor in the process by which it was created.

The difference between automatism as a primary and as a secondary factor is responsible for the two different directions in which Surrealist painting has moved. On the one side are Miró, Arp, Masson, Picasso, and Klee—the last two of whom are claimed by the Surrealists without their ever having formally attached themselves to the movement. On the other side are Ernst, Tanguy, Roy, Magritte, Oelze, Fink, and a myriad more, including Dali, who was several years ago excommunicated by the orthodoxy for political, not artistic, deviations. With the first group automatism may be relatively complete or incomplete, but in either case it is primary as a rule and intervenes decisively—even though it is impossible to determine with any satisfying exactness where in their painting the automatic stops and the conscious begins. The artist may doodle his picture from start to finish or he may elaborate accidentally discovered representational elements, or he may begin with a definite eidetic image. But he will never use methods learned at art school, and the

resemblances to actual phenomena will be schematic rather than realistic. A dog barking at the moon is indicated by certain unmistakable signs, but these are in the nature of provocations to the artist's "painterly" imagination, which seizes upon the signs as excuse for elaborating shapes and colors which do not image anything possible even as an idea off the flat picture surface. The dog and the moon become the springboard, not the subject of the work. Here the reliance upon the unconscious and the accidental serves to lift inhibitions which prevent the artist from surrendering, as he needs to, to his medium. In such surrender lies one of the particular advantages of modern art. Surrealism, under this aspect and only under this, culminates the process which has in the last seventy years restored painting to itself and enabled the modern artist to rival the achievements of the past.

The other direction of Surrealist painting can best be charted by fixing the almost invariable point at which the automatic procedure stops. Here too inspiration is sought by doodling, or in accidents of the medium, but it is found most often in images offering themselves spontaneously and rationally to the artist's mind before he picks his brush up. Sometimes he claims to do nothing more than transcribe a dream. But even the doodling, the rubbing of pencil on paper over a rough surface, or the observation of Leonardo's old wall is a means primarily of anticipating or inducing images, not of creating the picture itself. Automatism is made a secondary factor; for this type of Surrealist painting wishes to preserve the identifiable image at all costs, and complete automatism goes too far in the direction of the abstract.

Having received his inspiration, the painter most consciously goes to work to clothe the given image in pictorial forms that will produce a strong illusion of its possible existence in the world of real appearances. The subject matter is different, but the result is the same that the nineteenth-century academic artist sought. It makes no difference that the creatures, anatomies, substances, landscapes, or juxtapositions limned by the Surrealist violate the laws of probability: they do not violate the modalities of three-dimensional vision to which painting can now conform only by methods that have become academic. For all the problems involved in transferring faithfully the visual experience of three dimensions to a plane surface have been solved by this time, and where all the problems have been solved only academicism is possible. The Surrealist represents his more or less fantastic images in sharp and literal detail, as if they had been posed for him. Seldom does he violate any of the canons of academic technique, and he vies with and sometimes imitates color photography, even to the very quality of his paint. Dali's discontinuous planes and contradictory perspectives approximate photomontage. Ernst's volcanic landscapes look exceptionally well manufactured scenic postal cards.

[To be concluded]

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## DRAMA

### Furtherest West

**MAE WEST**—at least so I am told—is described in a recent and very high-brow book on the movies as "an impersonator of female impersonators." Now there is a phrase the full significance of which I would not guarantee to expound without a considerable period of preparatory meditation, but one of its meanings is both simple and familiar. Miss West is not, to put it bluntly, the least bit sexy, and many have noted that upon the sophisticated spectator the final effect of her desperate seductiveness is the effect of satire. To see victims actually succumbing to a display of lubricity so patently phony is very much like watching the deluded male who makes love to Charlie's aunt when we know all the time that the latter's billowy bosom is stuffed with feathers.

For a long time the only question remaining in my mind has been concerned with—to stretch a couple of terms—the attitude of this artist toward her art. Is she, I have asked, deliberately making fun of female charm in much the same way that eunuchs and homosexuals like to make fun of it, or does she, by any chance, really suppose that a twitch of the shoulder and a verbal hint as subtle as a fire siren is all that it takes to make what used to be called "a dangerous woman"? "Catherine Was Great," written by Miss West and performed by her at the Shubert Theater, seems to answer that question once and for all. There is nothing else that I can think of to say in its favor, but it does seem to remove all further doubt as to the star's intentions. Its bawdiness is as deadly serious in intention as it is deadly dull in effect. Miss West hopes that we will giggle at her daring but she hopes also that we will continue to take sex seriously and we are obviously expected to go home to wicked dreams.

A few seasons back "DuBarry Was a Lady" demonstrated how one of the great female lovers of history could be burlesqued and so made to yield a reasonable amount of not very subtle amusement. But "Catherine Was Great" is not, so at least I gather, intended to be burlesque. It is true that Miss West's interpretation of the empress differs only in costuming from her interpretation of Diamond Lil but that appears to be the result of her histrionic limitations, plus, perhaps, a conviction that all the *grandes amoureuses* are fundamentally alike, and not at all the consequence of any inten-

tion to burlesque. The serious portions of the play—and believe it or not, there are serious portions with a great deal of pompous bowing-about by very fancily dressed courtiers who move through some of the gaudiest scenery seen here in recent years—involve Catherine's plans "for her people," and they are written in the general style of "The Young Visitors." When, for example, the empress interrupts a discussion of the Turkish situation to say meaningfully to Potemkin, "Now let's talk about *you*," one is bound to conclude that such a historical drama as this has not been written since Beerbohm's "Savonarola."

As for the humor—there are, of course, supposed to be plenty of laughs—it is manufactured by the simple process of assuming that the audience may be trusted to find a double meaning in everything once it has been warned that a double meaning is intended. In the twenties, when we were easily amused, there used to be a very naughty parlor game which consisted in adding the phrase "in the middle of the bed" to the titles of books. Miss West has merely revived this game. If she tells a courtier that he has not filled her samovar this is supposed to be very dirty indeed. The game never was so very funny and it is not funny at all when solemnly played in the theater.

With a few very minor exceptions the large supporting cast is male and either very virile indeed, or quite nastily the contrary, so the star has nothing to match herself against. The best line of the evening will give some idea of what the others are like. Says Catherine when a rebel has escaped: "What do I have an army for? Don't answer that one."

I am very much afraid that we high-brows are going to have to give up the attempt to find something really significant in Mae. One of us—it may even have been I—once said that she was a vamp to end all vamps and that the evolution of Theda Bara into "Diamond Lil" showed how we were growing up. Miss West did not, I now fear, mean to end all vamps. She merely wanted to be a newer and more outspoken kind. But it is just possible that "Catherine Was Great" actually is "a Mae West Show to end all Mae West Shows" even though here again that was certainly not part of the author's intention.

Perhaps I should add that "Catherine Was Great" is not, as one would naturally assume, a musical show—except for one dirty song by the star. For once, the things too silly to be said on the stage are said anyway.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

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**ANNA LOUISE STRONG** first went to Russia in 1921, and has been a sympathetic observer of its development ever since. In 1930 she organized the Moscow *Daily News*, the first English language paper in Russia. Her books include "Children of Revolution," "The Soviet World," "The Remaking of America," and "I Change Worlds."

**P. E. CORBETT**, former professor of international law and jurisprudence at McGill University, was on the staff of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1924 and is now attached to the Yale Institute of International Studies. His books include "Canada and World Politics" and "Post-War Worlds."

**LOUIS KRONENBERGER**, drama critic of *PM*, is author of "Kings and Desperate Men," a study of eighteenth-century society, and editor of "An Eighteenth-Century Miscellany."

**RALPH BATES** is a close student of Spanish and South American politics. He helped organize the International Brigade that helped the Loyalists during the war in Spain, and fought with it for three years. Among his books are "Sirocco," "The Fields of Paradise," "Lean Men," "Rainbow Fish," "Siena," "The Olive Field," and "The Undiscoverables."

**DELMORE SCHWARTZ** teaches English at Harvard. He is the author of "Dreams Begin Responsibilities," "Shakespeare and the Problem of Literature," and "The Limitation of Literature and Other Problems of Literary Criticism."

**CLEMENT GREENBERG**, who views painting and sculpture regularly for *The Nation*, was formerly an editor of the *Partisan Review*.



# Letters to the Editors

## Will the World Wait?

(We print below a comment on Alvaro del Vayo's article, *No Unity with Fascists*, which appeared in *The Nation* of June 3. Professor McMahon, well-known liberal educator, was dismissed from the staff of Notre Dame last year for refusing to allow his superiors to edit his speeches. He is now teaching at the University of Chicago.)

Dear Sirs: Outside of a relatively few liberals in this country, I do not detect any burning zeal upon the part of the American people to support democratic movements in the rest of the world. I should be greatly astonished to learn that Elkhart, Ind., or Independence, Mo., is waxing indignant over the political situation in Italy.

This may be regrettable and exceedingly short-sighted, but it may likewise help explain the conservative flavor of Washington's foreign policy. The urge for peace and "order" seems pretty widespread, and we can expect an intensification of the spirit with the defeat of the Axis powers.

Popular indifference proceeds in part from overlooking the character of this war, which is as much an international civil war as it is a war between nations. We have trouble recognizing the enemy when he appears in civilian dress. Ill-equipped ideologically to fight the war, we are handicapped in even worse fashion for the winning of the peace. Education of course is the answer, but will the world wait?

FRANCIS E. MCMAHON

Chicago, July 25

## Challenge

Dear Sirs: Are ten million Americans to be denied an intelligent approach to the coming election? Can a global victory and lasting peace be insured by making American servicemen in the cultural void proposed under the recent interpretation of the Federal Voting Act, suppressing our finest liberal magazines from Army camps?

How do you propose to meet this dangerous challenge to free thought? What do I do?

PRIVATE

nowhere in Louisiana, July 24

## Climax

Dear Sirs: Victor Wolfson's review of my book, "The Hollywood Hallucination," is rather transparently a silly slander. Even the more innocent among your readers should recognize the old-fashioned trick of "quoting at random," especially falsifying in my case since my style to a large extent depends on a double-perspective irony, the specific value of climax, and the important element of context.

As to this last, ignored so cavalierly by Mr. Wolfson, it contains those "extraordinary" arguments about the movies at which he hints but which he is at pains to omit. Though obviously somewhat hot under the collar, your reviewer has no excuse for his overcalculated frivolity but the intention of being impertinent.

PARKER TYLER

New York, July 11

## Anti-Climax

Dear Sirs: Anyone who wishes to unravel Mr. Tyler's double-perspective irony style which also depends upon the specific value of climax, and the important element of context, is in for a jolly if somewhat strenuous time.

I can only caution them in Mr. Tyler's own words: "... the energy of man as an individual organism is limited; he must exile the light and return to the night from which he came in order to refuel the engine of his body and arise in the morning refreshed. (Context and double-perspective irony.) He must sleep." (Climax—and what a climax!)

VICTOR WOLFSON

New York, July 21

## Froth on Mr. Wylie's Mouth

Dear Sirs: After reading *Sex and the Censor* in your issue of July 8, I went back over a few of Mr. Wylie's astounding sentences, e.g., "Now there is no such thing as sex 'moral law' in any legal sense." "For the censoring of 'obscenity' is the work of the impure to whom all things are impure; illegal dirtiness cannot be detected save by a mind in which subjective dirtiness has already been installed..." Also took a second look at the penultimate paragraph which castigates Catholics for being "the most dogmatic group in these

affairs" and ends with the prohibition amendment as an example of the resultant catastrophe. The well-known position of ninety per cent of the Catholic population on the latter issue didn't seem to Mr. Wylie worth mentioning.

If the article is to be taken for anything more than reckless fulmination it would seem to prove what I have long since suspected, namely: That the dogmatism and fanaticism of scientism make that of the older religions feeble and innocuous in comparison. The author should wipe the froth from his own mouth before ordering straight jackets for people caught going to church.

R. T. MALONE

Lincoln, Nebr., July 14

## Music Critic 1944

Dear Sirs: I have been a reader of *The Nation* ever since I came to this country in 1939 and I am happy to say that in my opinion it is one of the best weeklies in the whole country. I therefore find it most regrettable that such a progressive and straightforward paper should have as its music editor a die-hard reactionary, such as Mr. Haggin has shown himself to be.

I read your music page with growing amazement and bewilderment. Is it true that today in 1944 there still is a music critic to whom the work of "Hindemith, Bartók, Berg, Schönberg, Stravinsky and the rest" is full of "aridities, uglinesses and horrors?"


As a member of the younger generation of pianists and one who proudly confesses to have boosted contemporary music on every possible and impossible occasion both in Europe and in this country, I simply cannot understand the attitude of Mr. Haggin about things modern and contemporary in music. He seems to be engaged in a one-man campaign against everything good written today in music. He goes even so far as to try to tell people that they should not believe their own ears and should not enjoy modern music even though they find it likeable and agreeable. A good music critic must first of all have two things: patience and understanding. Mr. Haggin has neither. I really begin to wonder sometimes: why does he write about music at all?

ANDOR FOLDES

New York, July 20

## Cross-Word Puzzle No. 76

By JACK BARRETT



## ACROSS

- 1 "In short, whoever you may be, To this conclusion you'll agree, When ----- is somebodee, Then no one's anybodee"  
 6 A tool, or a fool, may do this  
 10 She fell for Paris  
 11 Permissible perhaps, if white  
 12 Janus had two  
 13 Shot Pa? How affecting!  
 16 Is rare in a mountain range  
 17 A girl invited into the garden gets nothing in return for being sentimental  
 18 A pleasant-looking French Riviera resort  
 20 Its one object may be to give sauce  
 22 Hangs on to  
 23 Don't talk to a bad sailor about the pleasures of a sea cruise; he'll probably retort, "It's all ----!"  
 24 Rare product never found in the van  
 25 Larger edition of the weasel  
 27 Healing preparation for the lion after swallowing Holy Writ  
 29 May bring up oysters. Seems to make it a bit deeper, doesn't it?  
 34 An Oliver who asked for more  
 35 Out of shape  
 36 "Amens" might well come from this  
 37 A jar from Holland  
 38 Captain of the *Pinafore* who was never sick at sea. (Well, hardly ever)

## DOWN

- 2 A man's man  
 3 When she read that a girl was being held for -----, Simple Susie wondered why ----- couldn't hold his own girl  
 4 They may be slow, but they have a reputation for wisdom

- 5 The fencing solver will guess it  
 6 Who'd ever want to go to Baffin Land? Well, he did  
 7 Horse with a heart like one  
 8 There's a report when it is cracked  
 9 Tam of a Burns' poem  
 14 Schoolmaster of fiction with strong biblical bias  
 15 Sticks to  
 16 Character in *Arabian Nights* who was in bad almost throughout  
 18 The only virtue, according to Juvenal  
 19 Study this word: it is a town in New Hampshire that has lost its way  
 21 Number of cartridges in a round  
 25 She presented herself at court  
 26 A part, or most, of Norway  
 28 This will test you  
 30 Ask a Scot what "I ----- ken" means, and the chances are he'll say, "I don't know"  
 31 What do you make a certain odd number if you behead it?  
 32 Portion of chicken, with dressing of course  
 33 Box

## SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 75

ACROSS:—1 CUSTER; 5 PLASMA; 9 TEN-ABLE; 11 REMAND; 12 EASELS; 13 AHRI-MAN; 14 OGLE; 17 IGOR; 19 SEEDINESS; 22 KNEAD; 23 DETER; 25 MOTHER; 26 VESTAL; 27 DIVES; 29 UNION; 31 EARTH-LING; 34 NEON; 36 SAGE; 37 DOLEFUL; 39 APIARY; 40 LOUBET; 41 AERIALS; 42 RHEIMS; 43 YEASTY.

DOWN:—1 CURIOS; 2 SIMPLE; 3 ETNA; 4 REDHANDED; 5 PLEAD; 6 LEAN; 7 SLEDGE; 8 ABSURD; 10 AMIDST; 15 GER-MANE; 16 EDITION; 17 INSTILS; 18 OAK-LING; 20 EERIE; 21 REVER; 24 REST-FULLY; 28 VARESI; 29 UNFAIR; 30 IO-DINE; 32 IAMBUS; 33 GENTRY; 35 NOYES; 37 DRAM; 38 LOBE.

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